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Abstract
We investigate the following many-to-one
stable matching problem with diversity con-
straints (SMTI-DIVERSE): Given a set of students
and a set of colleges which have preferences over
each other, where the students have overlapping
types, and the colleges each have a total capacity
as well as quotas for individual types (the diversity
constraints), is there a matching satisfying all
diversity constraints such that no unmatched
student-college pair has an incentive to deviate?
SMTI-DIVERSE is known to be NP-hard. How-
ever, as opposed to the NP-membership claims in
the literature [Aziz et al., 2019; Huang, 2010], we
prove that it is beyond NP: it is complete for the
complexity class ΣP2. In addition, we provide a
comprehensive analysis of the problem’s complex-
ity from the viewpoint of natural restrictions to in-
puts and obtain new algorithms for the problem.
1 Introduction
Stability is a classic and central property of assignments, or
matchings, of agents to each other, describing that no two
agents actively prefer each other to their respective situations
in the matching. Stability is desirable in many scenarios
and spawned numerous works in various context [Manlove,
2013]. In this work we investigate the notion of stabil-
ity in combination with diversity, which is key in many
real-world matching applications, ranging from education,
through health-care systems, to job and housing markets [Ab-
dulkadirogˇlu, 2005; Huang, 2010; Kamada and Kojima,
2015; Kurata et al., 2017; Ahmed et al., 2017; Benabbou et
al., 2019; Gonczarowski et al., 2019; Aziz et al., 2019].
For this we conceptually distinguish two sets—a set of stu-
dents which should be matched to a set of colleges (each
with a maximum capacity to accommodate students) with the
additional constraint that the set of students matched to any
single college has to be diverse. The diversity requirements
are captured by types which are attributes that a student may
or may not have, and upper and lower quotas that specify
how many students of a certain type may be matched to a
given college. The terminology arises from the context of
Types S.Pref. S. C. C.Pref. Quotas C.
–L w1≻w2 u1
–L w1≻w2 u2 w1 u3≻u1≻u2 ≥1F, ≥1L 2
FL w2≻w1 u3 w2 u1≻u3≻u4≻u2 =1F, =1L 2
F– w2 u4
Table 1: Each of the students u1, . . . , u4 has preferences over the
two colleges (where w1 ≻ w2 indicates that w1 is preferred to w2)
and their types (Female, Local). Each of the colleges has prefer-
ences over the students, Quotas for individual types and a Capacity
to accommodate students.
controlled public school choice, a typical application of this
paradigm where it is desirable to match colleges to students
to ensure stability as well as demographic, socio-economic,
and ethnic diversity (see also affirmative action).
As an illustration, assume that there are four stu-
dents u1, . . . , u4 and two colleges w1, w2 as depicted in Ta-
ble 1. In terms of classical stability, one could match u1
and u2 to w1, and u3 and u4 to w2, without inducing any
blocking pairs, i.e., an unmatched student-college pair {u,w}
such that (1) u is unmatched or strictly prefers w to its as-
signed college M(u) and (2) w can either accommodate u
(without exceeding the capacity) or strictly prefers u to at
least one member in M(w). However, to ensure affirmative
action, among all assignees to w1 there must be at least one
female student and one local student, andw2 must receive ex-
actly one female student and exactly one local (as indicated
by the respective quotas in Table 1). A feasible matchingM1
(see the black solid lines) could be to match u1 and u3 to w1,
and u2 and u4 to w2. However, this is not stable since w2
may substitute its assignees u2 and u4 with u3 so as to obtain
a more preferred student while maintaining its diversity con-
straints. Another feasible matching M2 (see the red dashed
lines), which matches u2 and u3 to w1, and u1 and u4 to w2,
fulfills diversity constraints and is stable (see Section 2 for
formal definitions). Note that stable matchings fulfilling the
diversity constraints are not guaranteed to exist. For instance,
if student u2 in the above example does not find w1 accept-
able at all, then matching M1 is the only feasible matching
with diversity. However, it is not stable.
The study of stable matchings with diversity constraints
was initiated by Abdulkadirogˇlu [2005] in the context of col-
lege admissions. It has since become an ongoing and ac-
tively researched topic among economists and computer sci-
Problems FI-DIVERSE SMTI-DIVERSE
Constraints (ℓ∞ ≥ 0) (ℓ∞ ≥ 0) (ℓ∞ = 0)
Complexity NP-c♦ ΣP2-c [Th 1] NP-c [Th 2]
m+ u∞ NP-c
♦ ΣP2-c [Th 1] NP-c [Th 3]
t+ u∞ + q∞ NP-c[Pr 4] NP-c
♣[Th 2,Ob 2] NP-c [Th 2]
n P [Th 4] P [Th 4] P [Th 4]
m+ t P [Co 2] P [Th 5] P [Th 5]
m+ q∞ P [Pr 5] P [Pr 5] P [Pr 5]
Table 2: A complete picture of the complexity results for FI-
DIVERSE and SMTI-DIVERSE (see Section 2 for the definitions).
Results marked with ♦ are due to [Aziz et al., 2019, Proposition 5.1]
while the remaining ones are new. All hardness results hold even
for preferences with no ties, even if the corresponding measures are
upper-bounded by a constant. The NP-containment result marked
with ♣ holds already when either t or q∞ is a constant. The problem
variants for which fixed-parameter tractability results (FPT) exist do
not admit polynomial-size kernels (see Propositions 10 and 11).
entists, covered for example by two chapters [Heo, 2019;
Kojima, 2019] in the recently published book “On the Fu-
ture of Economic Design” [Laslier et al., 2019]. One of
the fundamental questions in this area is whether there is a
diverse and stable matching between students and colleges;
the corresponding computational problem is called SMTI-
DIVERSE (see Section 2 for formal definitions).
As has already been observed in the pioneering work
of Aziz, Gaspers, Sun and Walsh [2019] and hinted at in
Huang’s earlier work on a closely related problem [2010],
SMTI-DIVERSE is NP-hard. The authors further claimed
that the problem(s) under consideration belong to NP (see
also [Manlove, 2013, Chapter 5.2.5]). We disprove this claim
by presenting an involved reduction showing that the problem
is in fact complete for the complexity class ΣP2 (Theorem 1),
even under severe restrictions to the input instances.
Complementing this hardness finding, we systematically
analyze the complexity of the problem by considering nat-
ural relaxations (such as dropping lower quotas or dropping
stability) or restrictions (such as bounding the number n of
students, the number t of types, the number m of colleges,
and/or the maximum upper quota u∞, and the maximum ca-
pacity q∞). The outcome of our analysis is a full classifica-
tion of the complexity of SMTI-DIVERSE w.r.t. the consid-
ered restrictions and relaxations, presented in Table 2. We
highlight three key technical contributions of our work:
(1) SMTI-DIVERSE is ΣP2-complete even when the prefer-
ences do not have ties and there are only four colleges,
while two natural relaxations of the problem (either drop-
ping the lower quotas or the stability requirement) lower
the complexity to being NP-complete.
(2) When (a) the number of students, (b) the number of col-
leges and types, or (c) the number of colleges and maxi-
mum capacity is bounded by a constant, SMTI-DIVERSE
can be solved in polynomial time.
(3) SMTI-DIVERSE is NP-complete even when the prefer-
ences do not have ties, lower quotas are all zero, and the
number of types and the maximum upper quota and max-
imum capacity are bounded by a constant. Our reduction
showing this result also fixes a technical flaw in the re-
duction presented in Aziz et al.’s recent work [Aziz et al.,
2019, Proposition 5.3].
1.1 Related Work
If the number of types is equal to one, then SMTI-DIVERSE
is equivalent to the Hospitals/Residents with Lower Quotas
problem where no hospital is allowed to be closed (HR-LQ-
2), as studied by [Hamada et al., 2016]. This problem is
polynomial-time solvable when no ties are allowed [Manlove,
2013, Chapter 5.2.3]. We show that SMTI-DIVERSE be-
comes NP-hard even for only two types. The problem variant
(HR-LQ-1) where each hospital is allowed to be closed (i.e.,
receive no residents) was introduced by [Biro´ et al., 2010]
and proven to be NP-complete even if each upper and lower
quota is equal to three. Our SMTI-DIVERSE is different from
this problem as we do not allow colleges to be closed.
Huang [2010] introduced the closely related CLASSI-
FIED STABLE MATCHING (CSM) problem, which asks for
a matching that fulfills the diversity constraints and does not
admit the so-called blocking coalitions. Huang showed that
CSM is NP-hard and further claimed that it is in NP. However,
while blocking coalitions and blocking pairs are not compa-
rable in general, we show that our ΣP2-hardness reduction can
be adapted to show that CSM is indeed beyond NP: it is also
ΣP2-complete.
Aziz et al. [2019] studied school choice with diversity con-
straints, but with a slightly different stability condition: an
unmatched student-college pair {u,w} is d-blocking if it is
a blocking pair (in our sense) and the new solution fulfills
the diversity constraints for all remaining colleges instead
of w only. This means that a d-blocking pair is also a block-
ing pair, but the converse is not true. However, dropping
the lower quotas requirements renders both concepts equiv-
alent. Our model of blocking pairs is a natural extension
of the HR-LQ-2 problem where a student and a college al-
ready form a blocking pair once the new solution is better for
them, regardless of whether the other colleges’ lower quo-
tas. Such kind of model assumes that blocking condition is
tested based on local information of whether the deviating
college’s diversity constraints are fulfilled after the rematch-
ing. This is a standard assumption in many controlled school
choice articles [Abdulkadirogˇlu, 2005; Kurata et al., 2017;
Hamada et al., 2016]. Nevertheless, our ΣP2-hardness reduc-
tion also establishes the same hardness of their variant.
Abdulkadirogˇlu [2005], Hafalir et al. [2013], To-
moeda [2018], and Ina´cio [2016] studied SMTI-DIVERSE
for the specific case where every student and every college
has complete and strict preferences and every student belongs
to exactly one type.
Nguyen and Vohra [2019] studied stable matching with
proportionality constraints on the lower quotas. Kurata et
al. [2017] study stable matching with overlapping types and
consider the diversity constraints as soft bounds. Ismaili et
al. [2019] introduce and study weighted matching markets
with budget constraints in labor market, where the students
have preferences over the colleges and have wage require-
ments, and the colleges have preferences over subsets of the
students and each have a budget limit. The goal is to de-
cide whether there is a coalitionally stable matching, a match-
ing which satisfies the budget constraints and does not ad-
mit blocking coalitions. Our SMTI-DIVERSE problem dif-
fers from theirs in two ways: (1) while they allow colleges to
specify preferences over subsets of students which increases
the complexity in the input, we do not; (2) they allow both the
students and the colleges to have some form of weights, we do
not. They show that their problem is in general ΣP2-complete.
The reduction, however, heavily utilizes (1) and (2). Thus, it
is not obvious how to encode numbers and preferences over
subsets to make their reduction adaptable for us.
Finally, we mention that work in combination with di-
versity has been done on hedonic games [Bredereck et al.,
2019a], multi-winner elections [Bredereck et al., 2018], and
matchings [Ahmed et al., 2017].
2 Preliminaries
Given an integer z, we use [z] to denote the set {1, 2, . . . , z}.
Given two integer vectors x,y of the same dimension, i.e.,
x,y ∈ Zz for a non-negative integer z, we write x ≤ y if
for each index i ∈ [z] it holds that x[i] ≤ y[i]; otherwise, we
write x 6≤ y.
A preference list  over a set A is a complete, transitive
binary relation onA. We use≻ to denote the asymmetric part
(i.e., x  y and ¬(y  x)) and ∼ to denote the symmetric
part of  (i.e., x  y and y  x). We say that x is (strictly)
preferred (resp. weakly preferred) to y if x ≻ y (resp. x  y),
and that x and y are tied in  if x ∼ y;  is said to contain
ties in this case. We write [A] to denote an arbitrary but fixed
linear order on A (i.e., a preference list without ties). The
expression “x  Y ” (resp. “x ≻ Y ”) means that x is weakly
(resp. strictly) preferred to every one in Y .
Problem-Specific Terminology. The problemwe study has
as input a set T := [t] of types, a setU := {u1, u2, . . . , un} of
n students and a set W := {w1, w2, . . . , wm} of m colleges
together with the following information.
Each student u∈U has
(i) a preference list u over a subset A(u) ⊆ W of the
colleges, and
(ii) a type vector τu ∈ {0, 1}t, where τu[z] = 1 means that
u has type z.
Each college w ∈W has
(i) a preference list w over a subset A(w) ⊆ U of the
students, and
(ii) a lower-quota and upper-quota for each type which
is described, respectively, via the vectors ℓw and uw
∈ [n]t, where ℓw ≤ uw, and
(iii) a capacity qw ∈ [n] which is the maximum number of
students allowed to be admitted to w. Note that while
the capacity can be modeled by introducing an extra
type, leaving it separate from types allows for a more
refined analysis of the problem’s complexity.
We say that the input contains ties if it contains a preference
list  with ties; otherwise it contains no ties.
For each x ∈ U ∪ W , we call A(x) the acceptable set
of x, which contains all students or colleges that are accept-
able to x. Throughout the paper, we assume that no student
or college has an empty acceptable set, and for each student u
and each college w it holds that u ∈ A(w) iff. w ∈ A(u).
A matching M is a set of student-college pairs of the
form {u,w}, where each student u is involved in at most
one pair in M and w ∈ A(u). If {u,w} ∈ M , then we
say that u and w are assigned to each other by M . Slightly
abusing the notation, given a student u ∈ U if there exists a
college w ∈ W with {u,w} ∈ M , then we let M(u) := w;
otherwise we letM(u) := ⊥. We assume that each student u
prefers an acceptable collegew ∈ A(u) to⊥. Similarly, given
a college w ∈ W , we write M(w) := {u | {u,w} ∈ M} to
denote the set consisting of all students assigned to w byM .
Feasible and Stable Matchings. A matching M is
feasible for an instance (U,W, T, (τu,u)u∈U , (w
, ℓw, uw, qw)w∈W ) if each college w ∈ W (i) is as-
signed at most qw students, i.e., |M(w)| ≤ qw, and
(ii) meets the lower and upper quotas for each type, i.e.,
ℓw ≤
∑
u∈M(w) τu ≤ uw.
A student u and a college w form a blocking pair in a
matchingM if:
(i) u ∈ A(w) and {u,w} /∈M ,
(ii) student u strictly prefers w toM(u),
(iii) there exists a (possibly empty) subset U ′ ⊆ M(w) of
students such that w strictly prefers u to each student
from U ′, and
(iv) M ∪ {{u,w}} \ {{u′, w} | u′ ∈ U ′} is feasible for w.
Accordingly, we say that U ′ is a witness for {u,w} to
blockM . A matchingM is stable if it has no blocking pairs.
Problem Variants. Now, we formally state our main prob-
lem of interest—the natural generalization of the classical
MANY-TO-ONE STABLE MATCHING WITH TIES AND IN-
COMPLETE PREFERENCES (SMTI) [Manlove, 2013] to in-
corporate diversity constraints:
SMTI-DIVERSE
Input: A set U of n students, a set W of m col-
leges, a set T of types, the type vectors and preference
lists (τu,u)u∈U for the students, the preference lists,
lower-quota vectors, upper-quota vectors, and capaci-
ties (w, ℓw, uw, qw)w∈W for the colleges.
Question: Is there a feasible and stable matching?
We use SMI-DIVERSE to denote the restriction of SMTI-
DIVERSE to the case where ties are not present. More-
over, we use FI-DIVERSE to denote the problem of decid-
ing whether there is a feasible matching (representing a gen-
eralization for FEASIBLE MATCHING WITH INCOMPLETE
PREFERENCES).
The introductory example from Section 1 can be depicted
as follows, where the first type is about “being female” and
the second type is about “being local”.
Example 1. Below, we describe the type vectors (T.) and
the preference lists (Pref.) of the students (S.) as well as the
preference lists (Pref.), the lower quotas (LQ.), the upper
quotas (UQ.), and the capacities (C.) of the colleges from
Section 1; the preference lists do not have ties and are
always ordered by≻:
S. Pref. T. S. Pref. T. C. Pref. LQ. UQ. C.
u1 : w1 w2 01 u2 : w1 w2 01 w1 : u3 u1 u2 11 22 2
u3 : w2 w1 11 u4 : w2 10 w2 : u1 u3 u4 u2 11 11 2
As already discussed, there are two feasible matchings M1
and M2 with M1(w1)={u1, u3}, M1(w2)={u2, u4} and
M2(w1)={u2, u3},M2(w2) = {u1, u3}. ButM1 is blocked
by {u3, w2} because w2 would prefer to replace {u2, u4}
with u3 and u3 prefers w2 to w1. One can verify that M2 is
feasible and stable. If u2 does not accept w2, then no feasible
and stable matching exists.
3 How Hard is Diversity?
3.1 General Complexity
Aziz et al. [2019, Proposition 5.1] proved that FI-DIVERSE is
NP-complete; the hardness result holds even for a single col-
lege. They also claimed that determining whether there exists
a matching without d-blocking pairs is NP-complete [Aziz
et al., 2019, Proposition 5.3]. However, there are two sep-
arate issues with Proposition 5.3 in the aforementioned pa-
per. First of all, the proof used to show NP-membership is
technically flawed—in particular, while the proof claims that
“Deciding whether a stable outcome exists is in NP, since we
can guess an outcome X and check whether X admits blocking
pair in polynomial time”, by adapting the reduction of Aziz et
al. [2019, Proposition 5.1] we can show that this is impossible
unless P ⊆ coNP.
Proposition 1. Given a SMI-DIVERSE instance and a feasi-
ble matching M , it is coNP-hard to decide whether M does
not admit any blocking pairs or d-blocking pairs.
Proof. To show this, we adapt the reduction as given by Aziz
et al. [2019, Proposition 5.1]. (For the sake of completeness,
we describe the whole construction here.) We remark that
in the constructed instance there is only one single college.
Since for one college the notion of d-blocking pairs as used
by Aziz et al. is equivalent to our notion of blocking pairs we
only show the statement for our definition of blocking pairs.
We reduce an NP-complete variant of the EXACT COVER
BY 3-SETS problem [Garey and Johnson, 1979]. Note that
in this variant each element of the universe appears in exactly
three sets [Gonzalez, 1985].
RESTRICTED EXACT COVER BY 3-SETS (RX3C)
Input: A finite setX with |X | = 3q and a collection S
of 3-element subsets ofX , where each element appears
in exactly three sets.
Question: Does S contain an exact cover, i.e., a sub-
collection C ⊆ S such that every element of X occurs
in exactly one member of C?
Let I = (X,S) be an instance of X3C, where X =
{x1, . . . , xn∗}. We construct an instance of SMI-DIVERSE
as follows. Let U = {s | S ∈ S} ∪ {d},W = {w}, t = n∗.
For each set S ∈ S, the corresponding set-student s ∈ U has
types that correspond to the three elements contained in S.
Formally, for each type z ∈ [t] it holds that τs[z] = 1 if and
only if xz ∈ S. The special student d has all types which is
the most preferred student of the single college w. The lower
quota and upper quota of each type are exactly three. We
ask whether the feasible matchingM , which assigns the sin-
gle college w to all students but d, admits no blocking pairs.
Observe thatM is indeed feasible because each element in I
appeas in exactly three sets.
To show the coNP-hardness, it suffices to show that I has
an exact cover if and only ifM admits a blocking pair.
If there is an exact cover, then {d, w} is a blocking pair be-
cause replacing the students corresponding to the exact cover
with d results in a feasible matching which is better for w
and d.
On the other hand, ifM admits a blocking pair, it must be
{s, w} as this is the only pair not matched in M . In order to
form a blocking pair with d, there has to be someU ′ ⊆M(w)
which witnesses this. Because of the lower and upper quotas
on each type and the fact that d has every type, the witness U ′
has to “cover” each type exactly once. It is straight-forward to
verify that C = {S ∈ S | s ∈ U ′} forms an exact cover.
Note that Proposition 1 itself does not rule out that SMI-
DIVERSE is in NP. It just suggests the given proof is incor-
rect. There could in principle be a different non-deterministic
algorithm to place the problem in NP. We show that this is
not the case in our main result (Theorem 1), by showing ΣP2 -
hardness. For this we introduce a crucial gadget which is
used in several of our reductions. For the sake of recogniz-
ability the components of the gadget are marked with gray
background color, in particular whenever it occurs in reduc-
tions later.
Lemma 1. Let there be two types T = {1, 2}, and let
U ⊎ {r1, r2, r3} be a set of students with three distinguished
students r1, r2, r3, and let W ⊎ {a, b} be a set of colleges
with two distinguished colleges a and b. Similar to the for-
mat given in Example 1, the preference lists and type vectors
of students r1, r2, and r3, and the preference lists, the up-
per quotas, and the capacities of the colleges are depicted as
follows:
S. Pref. T. C. Pref. UQ. C.
r1 : b a 10 ∀w ∈ W : [U ] r2 11 qw
r2 : b [W ] a 11 a : r1 r2 r3 11 1
r3 : a b 01 b : r3 r2 r1 11 2
All students in U have zero types and arbitrary but fixed pref-
erences. All lower quotas are zero. The following holds for
every matchingM .
(1) IfM(a)={r2},M(b)={r1, r3}, and |M(w)∩U |=qw for
allw ∈ W , then no pair {u,w}with “u∈{r1, r2, r3} and
w∈{a, b}” or with “u = r2 and w ∈W” is blockingM .
(2) If |M(w)∩U |<qw for some w∈W , thenM is not stable.
Proof. Let M be an arbitrary matching. Statement (1): as-
sume that M(a) = {r2}, M(b) = {r1, r3}, and |M(w′) ∩
U | = qw′ for all w′ ∈ W . Towards a contradiction, suppose
thatM admits a blocking pair {u,w} with “u ∈ {r1, r2, r3}
and w ∈ {a, b}” or with “u = r2 and w ∈ W ”. Clearly,
u 6= r1 because r1 already receives her most preferred col-
lege. Consequently, w 6= a because a can only accommo-
date one student and only prefers r1 to its assigned student r2
but we have already reasoned that r1 is not involved in any
blocking pair. Similarly, u 6= r3. Moreover, w 6= b because b
already receives two students, but cannot replace r3 with r2
because of the upper quota for type 2. Thus, u = r2 and
w ∈ W . However, since |M(w) ∩ U | = qw and w does not
prefer u to any of its assigned student, it follows that {u,w}
is not a blocking pair, a contradiction.
Statement (2): Assume that there exists a college w ∈ W
with |M(w) ∩ U | < qw. Towards a contradiction, suppose
that M is stable. We distinguish between two cases, either
r2 ∈ M(w) or r2 /∈ M(w). If r2 ∈ M(w), then since r2
prefers b to w it follows that r3 ∈ M(b) as otherwise {r2, b}
forms a blocking pair. Moreover, r1 ∈M(b) because b is r1’s
most preferred college and r2 /∈ M(b). However, this means
that a receives no student at all and will form a blocking pair
with r3, a contradiction.
If r2 /∈ M(w), then r2 must be assigned to b as other-
wise {r2, w} is a blocking pair; note that all students in U
have zero types. Then, due to its upper quotas college b only
receives a student, namely r2. However, since a can only ac-
commodate one student, it follows that r1 or r3 is assigned
to no college. This implies that {r1, a} is a blocking pair (if
M(r1) = ⊥) or {r3, b} is a blocking pair (ifM(r3) = ⊥), a
contradiction.
With Lemma 1 in hand, we can prove that the problem is
not NP-complete but instead lies on the second level of the
polynomial hierarchy.
Theorem 1. SMTI-DIVERSE is ΣP2-complete, and remains
ΣP2-hard even if feasible matchings always exist, there are no
ties,m = 4 and u∞ = 3.
Proof. We establish the ΣP2-hardness of the problem by a
polynomial-time reduction from the following quantified sat-
isfiability problem, which can be shown to be ΣP2-complete.
NOT-1-IN-3-∃∀3SAT
Input: Two equal-size sets X and Y of Boolean vari-
ables; a Boolean formulaφ(X,Y ) overX∪Y in 3CNF,
i.e., a set of clauses each containing 3 literals. More-
over, each clause contains at least two literals from
Y ∪ Y .
Question: Does there exist a truth assignment of X
such that for each truth assignment of Y there is a
clause Cj which is not 1-in-3-satisfied (i.e., Cj does
not have precisely 1 true literal)?
Claim 1. NOT-1-IN-3-∃∀3SAT is ΣP2-hard, even if each
clause contains at least two literals from Y ∪ Y .
Proof of Claim 1. We begin by showing that the follow-
ing 1-IN-3-∀∃3SAT problem is ΠP2-hard, using the stan-
dard polynomial-time reduction from 3SAT to NOT-1-IN-3-
3SAT.
1-IN-3-∀∃3SAT
Input: Two equal-size sets X and Y of Boolean vari-
ables; a Boolean formulaφ(X,Y ) overX∪Y in 3CNF,
i.e., a set of clauses each containing three literals such
that at least two of them come from Y ∪ Y .
Question: Is it true that for each truth assignment of
X there exists a truth assignment of Y such that each
clause Cj is 1-in-3-satisfied (i.e., Cj is satisfied by ex-
actly one literal)?
Let φ(X∗, Y ∗) = (C∗1 , . . . , C
∗
s ) be a Boolean formula in
3CNF over two equal-size variable setsX∗ and Y ∗. For each
clause C∗j , containing three literals lit
1
j , lit
2
j , lit
3
j from vari-
ablesX∗∪Y ∗, we introduce four fresh variables aj , bj, cj , dj ,
and construct the following three clauses C1j , C
2
j , C
3
j such
that
C1j := (¬lit
1
j , aj , bj), C
2
j := (lit
2
j , bj , cj), and
C3j := (¬lit
3
j , cj , dj),
where ¬lit denotes z if z ∈ X∗ ∪ Y ∗; otherwise ¬lit de-
notes z. It is straightforward to verify that for all truth assign-
ment ofX∗ there exists a truth assignment of Y ∗ under which
(C∗j )1≤j≤s is satisfied if and only if for all truth assignment of
X∗ there exists a truth assignment of Y ∗∪{aj , bj , cj , dj | 1 ≤
j ≤ s} under which each clause Czj , 1 ≤ j ≤ s, 1 ≤ z ≤ 3,
is 1-in-3-satisfied. Moreover, the addition of 4 new variables
into Y ∗ can be mirrored by the addition of 4 new “dummy”
variables intoX∗ which do not occur in any clause. Since the
former problem is ΠP2-hard [Stockmeyer, 1976], we obtain
that 1-IN-3-∀∃3SAT is also ΠP2-hard. It is straight-forward
to see that the newly constructed clauses each have at least
two literals coming from Y ∪ Y .
Since an instance I of 1-IN-3-∀∃3SAT is a yes instance if
and only if I is a no instance of NOT-1-IN-3-∃∀3SAT, it fol-
lows from the well-known complementarity of these classes
that NOT-1-IN-3-∃∀3SAT is ΣP2-hard. ⋄
The idea. The idea of our main reduction is to construct,
from a given instance I of NOT-1-IN-3-∃∀3SAT with |X | =
|Y | = r and s clauses, an equivalent instance I ′ of SMI-
DIVERSE with 2r variable-types, s clause-types and 2 auxil-
iary types (the types are ordered in this sequence). Instance I ′
contains a special student d that has all the variable-types
and all the clause-types, and two distinguished colleges v, w
which can both accommodate d, but d prefers being in v.
Instance I ′ furthermore uses Lemma 1 to construct a gad-
get which ensures that a matching can only be stable if d is
matched to w—in particular, this will force a stable and fea-
sible matching to ensure {d, v} will not form a blocking pair.
Moreover, I ′ contains one clause-student dj for each
clauseCj and one student lit for each literal inX∪Y ∪X∪Y .
Student dj only has one type: the clause-type 2r + j corre-
sponding to Cj . Student lit has the variable-type i ∈ [r] cor-
responding to its variable as well as all the clause-types 2r+j
of every clause Cj containing lit. All Y -literal students only
want to go to v; all positive X-literal students prefer v to b
while all negativeX-literal students prefer b to v.
We can now explain the core of the reduction: the quo-
tas of v are set up in a way which ensures (assuming d is
matched to w) that precisely one literal-student for each vari-
able in X , both literal-students for each variable in Y , and
some clause-students must be matched to v. In particular,
a clause-student dj will be matched to v if and only if the
literal-student missing from v represents a literal in Cj . Once
set up, we show that {d, v} is blocking if and only if there is a
witness set of literal-students, and this witness set would rep-
resent an assignment which 1-in-3 satisfies I . In other words,
a feasible and stable matchingM exists if and only if there is
an assignment of theX-variables (which can be reconstructed
from M ) such that no assignment of the Y -variables 1-in-3-
satisfies all clauses.
Next, we formally describe our reduction, showing that
SMI-DIVERSE is as hard as NOT-1-IN-3-∃∀3SAT even if
there are only four colleges and a feasible matching always
exists.
Let I=(X={x1, . . . , xr}, Y={yr+1, . . . , y2r}, φ(X,Y ))
be an instance of NOT-1-IN-3-∃∀3SAT with s-many clauses
which each have at least two literals from Y ∪ Y . We con-
struct the following instance of SMI-DIVERSE.
The types. There are t := 2r+s+2 types: for each variable
there is a corresponding variable type, for each clause there is
a corresponding clause type, and there are two special types.
The students. For each literal lit ∈ X ∪X ∪ Y ∪ Y , there
is a literal student lit. The type vector τlit of student lit is
constructed as follows:
• For each type z ∈ [2r] if lit ∈ {xz, xz , yz, yz}, then let
τlit[z] := 1; otherwise let τlit[z] := 0.
• For each j ∈ [s] let τlit[2n′ + j] := 1 if Cj contains lit;
otherwise let τlit[2r + j] := 0.
• Student lit has neither type 2r+s+1 nor type 2r+s+2,
i.e., τlit[2r + s+ 1] := τlit[2r + s+ 2] := 0.
We introduce four special students d, r1, r2, and r3. They
have the following types:
τd :={1}
2r+s00, τr1 :={0}
2r+s10,
τr2 :={0}
2r+s11, τr3 :={0}
2r+s01.
We also introduce s clause-students D = {d1, . . . , ds} such
that for each j ∈ [s] student dj has exactly one type, namely:
∀z ∈ T \ {2r + j} : τdj [z] := 0, and τdj [2r + j] := 1,
In other words, the type of dj corresponds to the clauseCj .
The colleges. There are four colleges v, w, a, and b. Their
capacities and type-specific lower and upper quotas are de-
fined as follows:
• Let qv := 3r + s, qw := 1, qa := 1, and qb := r + 2.
• Let ℓv := uv := {1}r{2}r{3}s00.
• Let ℓw := {0}2r+s+2 and uw := {1}2r+s+2.
• Let ℓa := {0}2r+s+2 and ua := {0}2r+s11.
• Let ℓb := {1}r{0}r+s+2 and ub := {1}r{0}r{1}s+2.
S. Pref. C. Pref. LQ. UQ. C.
r1: b a w:d r2 0
2r+s+2 12r+s+2 1
r2: b w aa: r1 r2 r3 0
2r+s+2 02r+s11 1
r3:a b b: r3 r2 r1 [X ] [X] 1
r0r+s+2 1r0s1s+2 r + 2
d: v w v: [D] d [Y ] [Y ] [X] [X ]1r2r3s00 1r2r3s00 3r+s
xi:v b
xi:b v
Table 3: A description of the preference lists, quotas and capaci-
ties of the colleges, together with the preference lists of the students
from {r1, r2, r3, d} ∪X ∪X , used in the proof of Theorem 1.
The preference lists of the students. For each vari-
able xi ∈ X the preference lists of the literal students xi
and xi are as follows:
xi : v ≻xi b and xi : b ≻xi v.
Each clause student dj ∈ D, and each literal student lit ∈
Y ∪ Y contains only v in its preference list. The preference
list of the special students are:
d : v ≻d w, r1 : b ≻r1 a,
r2 : b ≻r2 w ≻r2 a, r3 : a ≻r3 b.
The preference lists of the colleges. The preference lists
of the four colleges are as follows:
v : [D] ≻v d ≻v [Y ] ≻v [Y ] ≻v [X] ≻v [X ],
w : d ≻w r2,
a : r1 ≻a r2 ≻a r3,
b : r3 ≻b r2 ≻b r1 ≻b [X ] ≻b [X].
This completes the construction, which can clearly be done
in polynomial time (also see Table 3 for an illustration). We
denote the constructed instance by I ′. We first claim that I ′
admits a feasible matching.
Claim 2. The constructed instance I ′ admits a feasible
matching.
Proof of Claim 2. We prove a slightly stronger claim. No-
tably, consider an arbitrary matching M constructed as fol-
lows. LetX ′ ⊆ X ∪X with |X ′| = n such that for each i ∈
[n] it holds that |{xi, xi} ∩X ′| = 1. In other words, X ′ de-
fines a truth assignment forX . LetM(v) := X ′∪Y ∪Y ∪D′,
whereD′ := {dj | |Cj ∩ (X ′ ∪ Y ∪ Y )| = 2}. LetM(w) :=
{d},M(a) := {r2}, andM(b) :=({r1, r3} ∪X ∪X)\X ′.
It is straightforward to verify that matching M fulfills all
capacity and type (diversity) constrains. Indeed, the type con-
straints for the first 2r types are met trivially, while the type
constraints corresponding to clauses are met by the fact that
each clause contains either 3 or 2 literals that were matched
to v (since for all j ∈ [m], |Cj ∩ (X ′ ∪ Y ∪ Y )| ≥ 2), and in
the latter case the type constraint is met by the addition of the
respective clause student. ⋄
Before we continue with the correctness proof, we observe
the following properties that each feasible and stable match-
ing must fulfill.
Claim 3. Each feasible and stable matching M of I ′ must
satisfy the following.
(1) For each xi ∈ X either (i) M(xi) = v and M(xi) = b
or (ii)M(xi) = v andM(xi) = b.
(2) M(d) = w.
(3) Y ∪ Y ⊆M(v).
(4) For each Cj it holds that dj ∈M(v) if and only if |Cj ∩
M(v)| = 2.
Proof of Claim 3. We first show Statement (2) as the other
statements are based on this. For Statement (2), observe
that regarding types 2r + s + 1 and 2r + s + 2, the
sets {d} ⊎ {r1, r2, r3} and {w} ⊎ {a, b} correspond exactly
to students U ⊎ {r1, r2, r3} and collegesW ⊎ {a, b} given in
Lemma 1. By Lemma 1(2) it follows that |M(w)∩{d}| = 1,
i.e.,M(d) = w.
Statement (1) holds because d /∈M(v) (see Statement (2))
and due to the quotas of v and b on theX-types.
Statement (3) holds because d /∈M(v) (see Statement (2))
and due to the Y -quotas of v.
It remains to show Statement (4). For the “only if” part,
assume that dj ∈ M(v). Since τdj [2r + j] = 1 and ℓv[2r +
j] = uv[2r + j] = 3 it follows M(v) contains exactly two
literal students lit and lit′ with M(v) ∩ Cj = {lit, lit
′}. For
the “if” part, assume that |M(v) ∩ Cj | = 2. Similarly, since
d /∈ M(v) and since ℓv[2r + j] = uv[2r + j] = 3 and since
dj is the only student (other than those from Cj) which has
type 2r + j, it follows that dj ∈M(v). ⋄
Now, we proceed to establish the correctness of the re-
duction, i.e., I is a yes instance if and only if the con-
structed SMI-DIVERSE instance I ′ admits a feasible and sta-
ble matching.
For the “only if” part, assume that I is a yes instance. Let
σX be a truth assignment for X which “witnesses” that I is
a yes instance. Let X ′ := {xi | σX(xi) = true} ∪ {xi |
σX(xi) = false}. Let M be a matching constructed as fol-
lows:
1. M(v) := X ′ ∪ Y ∪ Y ∪ D′, where D′ := {dj | |Cj ∩
(X ′ ∪ Y ∪ Y )| = 2},
2. M(w) := {d},
3. M(a) := {r2},
4. M(b) := {r1, r3} ∪ (X ∪X \X ′).
We claim that M is feasible and stable. It is straightfor-
ward to verify that M is feasible; note that by Claim 1 we
know that if dj /∈ M(v) then |Cj ∩ (X ′ ∪ Y ∪ Y )| = 3
for all j ∈ [s]. Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that
M is not stable. That is, it is blocked by some unmatched
pair {α, β} with β ∈ {a, b, v, w}. Now, observe that re-
garding the special types 2r + s + 1 and 2r + s + 2 stu-
dents {d} ∪ {r1, r2, r3} and collegesW ∪ {a, b} correspond
exactly to the studentsU∪{r1, r2, r3} and collegesW∪{a.b}
given in Lemma 1. By Lemma 1(1), we immediately have
that no unmatched pair {u′, w′} with u′ ∈ {r1, r2, r3} and
w′ ∈ {a, b} is blockingM . Further, observe that college w is
not involved in a blocking pair asw has only capacity one and
already receives its most preferred student. Similarly, neither
is any student in Y ∪ Y involved in a blocking pair. This
means that α ∈ X ∪X ∪ {d} ∪D.
We now distinguish between four cases; in each case, let S
be the witness for the considered blocking pair.
(1) If α = xi for some i ∈ [r], then β = v and the set {xi}
is the only subset of students which can be replaced with
xi such that the new matching remains feasible for v re-
garding theX-types. However, college v prefers xi to xi,
meaning that {xi, v} is not a blocking pair.
(2) Similarly, if α = xi for some i ∈ [r], then β = b and
the set {xi} is the only subset of students which can be
replaced with α such that the new matching remains fea-
sible for β regarding the X-types. Again, b prefers xi
to xi, meaning that {xi, b} is not a blocking pair.
(3) If α = dj for some j ∈ [s], then β = v. However, no sub-
set of students assigned to v can be replaced so that the
resulting matching remains feasible for v regarding the
X-types and the Y -types because dj has only type 2r+j.
(4) Finally, if α = d, then β = v; this represents the “core”
of the reduction. In this case, there must be a subset of
literal students Y ′ ⊆ Y ∪ Y ⊆M(v) with |Y ′| = r such
that for each i ∈ {r + 1, . . . , 2r} it holds that |{yi, yi} ∩
Y ′| = 1 and S = X ′ ∪ Y ′; recall that X ′ = M(a) ∩
(X ∪ X) and note that D ∩ S = ∅ as college v prefers
each clause student to d. Now, define a truth assignment
for Y by letting σY (yi) := true if and only if yi ∈ Y ′.
Since I is a yes instance, it follows that there exists a
clause Cj = (lit
1
j , lit
2
j , lit
3
j ) which does not have exactly
one true literal under σx and σy . If Cj has no true literal
under σX and σY , then |{u ∈ M(v) \ S | τu[2r + j] =
1}| = 3, a contradiction to the assumption that replacing
S with d is feasible for v because τd[2r + j] = 1. If
Cj has more than one true literal under σX and σY , then
|{u ∈ M(a) \ S | τu[2r + j] = 1}| ≤ 1, which once
again represents a contradiction to the assumption that
replacing S with d is feasible for v.
In any case, we arrive at a contradiction. Thus, I is a yes
instance.
For the “if” part, assume that I ′ is a yes instance, i.e.,
there exists a feasible and stable matching, called M . De-
fine X ′ := M(v) ∩ (X ∪X) as the subset of literal students
from X ∪ X which are assigned to v. By Claim 3(1), X ′
defines a truth assignment of X . Let σX be the truth as-
signment of X corresponding to X ′, i.e, σX(xi) := true if
and only if xi ∈ X ′. Consider an arbitrary truth assign-
ment σY of Y and let Y
′ be the subset of literal students
that correspond to σY , i.e, Y
′ := {yi ∈ Y | σY (yi) =
true}∪{yi | σY (yi) = false}. DefineA := X
′∪Y ′; note that
A ⊆ M(v) due to Claim 3(3). By Claim 3(2), M(d) = w.
Hence, d prefers v to M(d). Moreover, v prefers d to ev-
ery student from A. Since M is stable, it must hold that
M \
(
{{lit, v} | lit ∈ A} ∪ {d, w}
)
∪ {{d, v}} is not feasible
for v. Observe that by Claim 3(1,3,4), the studentsM(v) as-
signed to v reach the upper quota of each type for v. By the
type quotas of v and by the type vector of d, we have to show
that
∑
lit∈A τlit 6= {1}
2r+s00. Clearly, for each z ∈ [2r], it
holds that |{lit ∈ A | τlit[z] = 1}| = 1. Thus, to ensure that
{d, v} is not blockingM , there must exist some type 2n+ j
such that
∑
lit∈A τlit ∈ {0, 2, 3} because τd[2r+ j] = 1. This
implies that Cj obtains no, exactly two, or exactly three liter-
als under σX ∪ σY . In other words, Cj is not 1-in-3-satisfied
under σX ∪ σY , implying that I is a yes instance.
It remains to show that SMTI-DIVERSE is contained in
the complexity class ΣP2. Intuitively, observe that the prob-
lem can be stated as “deciding whether there exists a feasi-
ble matching for I such that every unmatched student-college
pair {u,w} is not blockingM”, i.e., via an existential quan-
tification followed by a universal quantification—which is a
well-known characterization of problems in ΣP2 [Papadim-
itriou, 1994, Theorem 17.8].
To formalize, observe that given an instance I of SMTI-
DIVERSE and a matching M of I , checking M is not sta-
ble can be done by a non-deterministic polynomial-time or-
acle machine: we can simply guess an unmatched student-
college pair {u,w} and a subset U ′ of students assigned to
college w and check in polynomial time whether U ′ wit-
nesses that {u,w} is a blocking pair for M . This implies
that given an instance of SMTI-DIVERSE and a matching for
I checking whether M is not feasible or not stable for I is
in NP; note that checking whether M is not feasible can be
even done in polynomial time. Let O be such an NP ora-
cle. Then, SMTI-DIVERSE belongs to NPNP because there
exists an non-deterministic polynomial-time Turing machine
that on an input I of SMTI-DIVERSE guesses a matchingM
and asks oracle O whether M is not feasible or not stable
for input I . It returns yes if and only if the oracle says no.
By definition, NPNP = ΣP2 [Papadimitriou, 1994, Definition
17.2], implying that SMTI-DIVERSE lies in ΣP.
To see why the reduction behind Theorem 1 can be used to
directly show ΣP2-hardness for the problem studied by Aziz et
al. [2019] we observe that in the constructed instance, {d, v}
is a blocking pair if and only if it is a d-blocking pair. Re-
call that an unmatched pair {u,w} is a d-blocking pair of a
matching M if there exists a subset S ⊆ M(w) of assigned
students which is a witness that {u,w} is blocking M and
M ∪ {u,w} \
(
{u,M(u)} ∪ {{u′, w} | u′ ∈ S}
)
is feasible
for all colleges.
Corollary 1. The SCHOOL CHOICE WITH DIVERSITY
CONSTRAINTS problem studied by Aziz et al. [2019] is ΣP2-
complete.
Proof. The SCHOOL CHOICE WITH DIVERSITY CON-
STRAINTS problem has as input a SMI-DIVERSE instance
and asks whether there exists a feasible matching which does
not admit any d-blocking pairs. To show that this problem is
also ΣP2-hard, we use the same construction as given in Theo-
rem 1. Let I ′ be the instance constructed in the ΣP2-hardness
proof of Theorem 1. To show the correctness, it suffices to
show that a feasible matchingM is stable for I ′ if and only if
it does not admit any d-blocking pair.
For the “only if” part, assume that M is a feasible and
stable matching for I ′. This means that no unmatched pair
is blocking M . Since by definition each d-blocking pair
is a blocking pair, we infer that no unmatched pair is d-
blockingM .
For the “if” part, assume that M is a feasible matching
which does not admit any d-blocking pair. First of all, we
observe and show that properties as given in Claim 3 can be
also shown forM . We first claim that d ∈ M(w). Suppose,
for the sake of contradiction, that d /∈ M(w). Then, by the
preferences of w it must hold thatM(r2) r2 w as otherwise
{r2, w} forms a d-blocking pair; note that both a and b have
zero lower quotas regarding types 2r+ s+1 and 2r+ s+2.
If M(r2) = w, then r3 ∈ M(b) as otherwise {r2, b} is a d-
blocking pair. Then, it must hold that r1 ∈M(b) as otherwise
{r1, b} is a d-blocking pair. However, a will receive no stu-
dent and will form with r3 a d-blocking pair, a contradiction.
If M(r2) = b, then neither r3 nor r1 can be assigned to
b anymore because of the upper quotas regarding types 2r +
s+1 and 2r+s+2. Since a has only capacity one, it follows
that r1 or r3 will remain unmatched. If M(r1) = ⊥, then it
will form with a a d-blocking pair. If M(r3) = ⊥, then it
will form with b a d-blocking pair. In other words, we infer
a contradiction for the case when M(r2) = b. Together, we
have shown that d ∈ M(w). Consequently, we can infer that
M(a) = {r2} and {r1, r3} ⊆M(b).
Then, by the quotas of Y -types andX-types for colleges v
and w, it follows that
• For each xi ∈ X either (i) M(xi) = v andM(xi) = b
or (ii)M(xi) = v andM(xi) = b.
• Y ∪ Y ⊆M(v).
Moreover, for each Cj it holds that dj ∈ M(v) if and only if
|Cj ∩M(v)| = 2.
Summarizing, there exists a subset X ′ ⊆ X ∪ X with
|X | = r, where for each i ∈ [r] it holds that |{xi, xi}∩X
′| =
1 such that
(1) M(v) = X ′ ∪ Y ∪ Y ∪ D′, where D′ := {dj | |Cj ∩
(X ′ ∪ Y ∪ Y )| = 2}.
(2) M(w) := {d}.
(3) M(a) := {r2}.
(4) M(b) := {r1, r3} ∪ (X ∪X \X ′).
Now, we show that M does not admit any blocking pair.
Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, thatM admits a block-
ing pair {α, β} with β ∈ {v, w, a, b}. Clearly, β 6= w as it al-
ready obtains its most preferred student. Further, α /∈ X ∪X
because of the following reasons: If α = xi, then it must
hold that M(xi) = b, M(xi) = v, and α = v. However, v
prefers xi to xi. Similarly, if α = xi, then it must hold that
M(xi) = v,M(xi) = b, and α = b. However, b prefers xi to
xi. Next, we distinguish between three cases for the choices
of β.
• If β = a, then α = r1. This would imply that {r1, a}
is also a d-blocking pair because M(r1) = b has zero
lower quotas regarding the types 2r+s+1 and 2r+s+2,
a contradiction.
• If β = b, then α ∈ {xi, xi} for some i ∈ [r]. However,
we have just reasoned that α /∈ X ∪X .
• If β = v, then α ∈ {dj, d} for some j ∈ [s] and
some i ∈ [r].
On the one hand, if {dj, v} would form a blocking pair,
then M(dj) = ⊥ and thus, {dj , v} would also form a
d-blocking pair, a contradiction. On the other hand, if
{d, v}would form a blocking pair, then sinceM(d) = w
has zero lower quotas for all types, it follows that {d, v}
would also form a d-blocking pair, a contradiction.
All together, we achieve our claim that M is stable. This
completes the proof for showing hardness.
Finally, let us turn the ΣP2-containment. Similarly to the
containment proof for Theorem 1, it suffices to show that
given a matching M we can check whether M is not fea-
sible or admits a d-blocking pair using a non-deterministic
polynomial-time oracle machine: Check whether M is not
feasible in polynomial time, and guess an unmatched student-
college pair {u,w} and a subset U ′ of students assigned to
college w and check in polynomial time whether U ′ “wit-
nesses” that {u,w} is a d-blocking pair forM .
The proof of Theorem 1 can also be adapted to correct
an erroneous theorem pertaining to a related problem called
CLASSIFIED STABLE MATCHING (CSM) [Huang, 2010,
Theorem 3.1]. In particular, that theorem claims that CSM is
NP-complete, but it is in effect also ΣP2-hard. The idea for the
adaption is to construct dummy variable students with zero-
types and introduce additional types to ensure that {v, d} is a
blocking pair in the proof of Theorem 1 if and only if v forms
with d and the dummy variable students a blocking coalition.
Proposition 2. CLASSIFIED STABLE MATCHING is ΣNP2 -
complete; the hardness holds even for only four colleges.
Proof. Before we show the statement, we repeat the defi-
nition of CLASSIFIED STABLE MATCHING [Huang, 2010]
(also see [Manlove, 2013, Chapter 5.2.5]) for the sake of com-
pleteness. CLASSIFIED STABLE MATCHING instances are
the same as SMI-DIVERSE instance; in particular we assume
preference lists without ties. The task is to decide whether
there exists a matching which is feasible and c-stable; we use
a different name to distinguish it from our stability definition:
A matching for an input I = (U,W, T, (≻u, τu)u∈U , (≻w
, ℓw, uw, qw)w∈W ) is c-stable if it does not admit a blocking
coalition, where a blocking coalition of M comprises a col-
lege wj ∈ W and a set U ′ = {u′i1 , . . . , u
′
ik
} ⊆ A(wj) of
k ≥ |M(wj)| students with u′is ≻wj u
′
is+1
, s ∈ [k − 1], such
that
(1) {{u,wj} | u ∈ U ′} is feasible for wj ;
(2) each student in u ∈ U ′ \M(wj) prefers wj toM(u);
(3) either college wj prefers u
′
is
to ujs or u
′
is
= ujs ,
s ∈ [|M(wj)|], where (uj1 , . . . , uj|M(wj)|) denotes the
sequence of students assigned to wj byM in decreasing
order of preferences of wj ;
(4) k > |M(wj)| or there exists some s such that wj strictly
prefers u′is to uis .
By the above definition, a blocking coalition involving a col-
lege w must involve at least the same number of students as
are assigned to w (Property (4)), such that w weakly prefers
the coalition to its assigned students (Property (3)), and if the
numbers are the same, then w must strictly prefer the coali-
tion to its assigned students. Due to this, a blocking pair
corresponds to a blocking coalition if and only if the corre-
sponding witness consists of at most one student. However,
in our reduction for Theorem 1, the witness for a blocking
pair is very large. To adapt our construction for this differ-
ent c-stability notion, we need to introduce dummy students
(with none of the constructed types) that together with the
blocking pair form a blocking coalition. To make sure that
no unintended blocking coalitions pop up, we also need to
duplicate variable students, clause students, and the special
student, and introduce additional types to control the size of
the blocking coalitions.
Formally, let I=(X={x1, . . . , xr}, Y={yr+1, . . . , y2r},
φ(X,Y )) be an instance of NOT-1-IN-3-∃∀3SAT with s-
many clauses, which each have at least two literals from
Y ∪ Y . LetX ∪X ∪ Y ∪ Y ∪D ∪ {d} ∪ {r1, r2, r3} be the
students, and let {v, w, a, b} be the colleges constructed in the
reduction for Theorem 1; recall that D = {dj | j ∈ [s]}. We
introduce 2r + 2s+ 3 types, where the first 2r + s+ 2 types
are the same as the ones introduced in the reduction for The-
orem 1. Now, for each i ∈ [2r], we also introduce a dummy
variable student, called fi, and for each j ∈ [s], we introduce
a c-clause student, called ej . Let F and E denote the set of
all dummy variable students and c-clause students, respec-
tively. Finally, we introduce a copy of the special student d,
called d′. The role of d′ is to be replaced with d in a blocking
coalition, while the role of F is to form a blocking coalition
with {d, v}. The set of colleges remains unchanged.
The types of the students. Each literal student lit ∈ X ∪
X ∪Y ∪Y has the same types as that in the preceding reduc-
tion. The same holds for the three special student r1, r2, r3.
More precisely, the type vector τlit of student lit is constructed
as follows.
• For each type z ∈ [2r] if lit ∈ {xz, xz , yz, yz}, then let
τlit[z] := 1; otherwise let τlit[z] := 0.
• For each j ∈ [s] let τlit[2r + j] := 1 if Cj contains lit;
otherwise let τlit[2r + j] := 0.
• Student lit has no types in {2r+s+1, . . . , 2r+2s+3}.
The type vector of the special students are:
τr1 :={0}
2r+s10{0}s+1, τr2 :={0}
2r+s11{0}s+1,
τr3 :={0}
2r+s01{0}s+1.
No dummy variable student fi (i ∈ [r]) possesses any type.
Each clause student dj ∈ D has two types 2r + j and 2r +
s+ 2 + j. Each c-clause student ej ∈ D has only type 2r +
s+ 2+ j. The types of the special students and her copy are:
τd :={1}
2r+s00{0}s1, τd′ :={0}
2r+2s+21.
The preference lists of the students. The preferences of
the students fromX∪X∪Y ∪Y ∪{r1, r2, r3} remain the same
as in the other reduction. Formally, for each variable xi ∈
X the preference lists of the literal students xi, xi and the
dummy variable student fi are as follows:
xi : v ≻xi b , xi : b ≻xi v, and fi : v ≻fi w.
Each literal student lit ∈ Y ∪Y has only v in her preferences.
The preference list of the special students are:
d : v ≻d w, d
′ : v,
r1 : b ≻r1 a, r2 : b ≻r2 w ≻r2 a, r3 : a ≻r3 b.
The preferences of each clause student dj and c-clause stu-
dent ej , j ∈ [s] are:
dj : v ≻dj b and ej : b ≻ej v.
The preference lists of the colleges. The preference lists
of v and b are changed while the others remain the same:
v : e1 ≻v d1 ≻v . . . ≻v es ≻v ds ≻v d ≻v d
′ ≻v
[{fr+1, . . . ,≻v f2r}] ≻v [Y ] ≻v [Y ] ≻v
f1 ≻v x1 ≻v x1 ≻v . . . ≻v fr ≻v xr ≻v xr,
w : d ≻ [F ] ≻w r2,
a : r1 ≻a r2 ≻a r3,
b : r3 ≻b r2 ≻b r1 ≻b [X ] ≻b [X] ≻b [D] ≻ [E].
This completes the construction, which can clearly be done
in polynomial time. In total, there are 5r + 5 + 2s students
and four colleges. We denote the constructed instance by I ′.
We claim that I is a yes instance if and only if the constructed
CLASSIFIED STABLE MATCHING instance I ′ admits a feasi-
ble and c-stable matching.
For the “only if” part, assume that I is a yes instance.
Let σX be a truth assignment of X which “witnesses” that
I is a yes instance. Let X ′ := {xi | σX(xi) = true} ∪ {xi |
σX(xi) = false}. Let M be a matching constructed as fol-
lows:
1. M(v) := X ′ ∪ Y ∪ Y ∪ D′ ∪ E′, where D′ := {dj |
|Cj ∩ (X
′ ∪ Y ∪ Y )| = 2} and E′ = {ej | |Cj ∩ (X
′ ∪
Y ∪ Y )| 6= 2}.
2. M(w) := {d} ∪ F .
3. M(a) := {r2}.
4. M(b) := {r1, r3}∪(X∪X \X ′)∪(D∪E \(D′∪E′)).
We claim that M is feasible and c-stable. It is straight-
forward to verify that M is feasible; recall that in instance I
each clause contains at least two literals from Y ∪ Y so that
the quotas of the clause types for v are indeed fulfilled.
Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that M is not c-
stable. That is, it is blocked by some coalition (β, U ′ =
{u′i1 , u
′
i2
, . . . , u′i′
k
}) with β ∈ {w, v, a, b}. For the sake of
notation, let U ′′ := U ′ \M(β). Similar properties as stated
in Lemma 1 also hold for blocking coalitions. To be com-
plete, we consider every college explicitly.
Case 1: β = a. Then, since qa = 1, it must hold that
k′ = 1. However, similarly to the proof for Lemma 1 we
infer that no blocking coalition involves college a.
Case 2: β = b. Then, k′ = r + s + 2 because k′ ≥
|M(b)| = r + s + 2 = qb. If r2 ∈ U ′ then r3 /∈ U ′ because
of type 2r + s + 2. However, college b strictly prefers r3 to
r2, a contradiction to Property (3). Thus, r2 /∈ U ′, and con-
sequently r3, r1 ∈ U ′. In other words, U ′′ ∩{r1, r2, r3} = ∅.
Since U ′′ is a blocking coalition and k′ = |M(b)|, there
must be some i ∈ [r] such that xi ∈ U ′′ or there must be
some j ∈ [s] such that dj ∈ U ′′. Then, by the definition
of M , it must hold that xi ∈ M(v) or dj ∈ M(v). How-
ever, both xi and dj strictly prefer her assigned college v to b,
a contradiction to Property (2) in the definition of blocking
coalition. Thus, U ′′ = ∅, implying that U ′ = M(b) and no
blocking coalitions involve college b.
Case 3: β = w. This is not possible because college w
already receives its 2r + 2 most preferred students.
Case 4: β = v. Then, k′ = 2r + s+ 1 because |M(v)| =
2r+s+2 = qv . In this case, we first show that the following.
Claim 4. It holds thatM(v) ∩ (D ∪ E) = U ′ ∩ (D ∪E).
Proof. Suppose, for the sake contradiction, thatM(v)∩(D∪
E) 6= U ′ ∩ (D ∪ E). Observe that due to the quotas for the
types {2r+s+3, . . . , 2r+2s} for each j ∈ [s] either ej or dj
belongs toM(v), and the same holds for U ′. Hence, we infer
that |M(v) ∩ (D ∪ E)| = |U ′ ∩ (D ∪ E)| = s. This means
in particular that when we compare the students in U ′ with
the students in M(v), for each j′ ∈ [s] we have to compare
U ′ ∩ {ej′ , dj′} to M(v) ∩ {ej′ , dj′}. If ej′ ∈ U ′′, then by
the definition of M it must hold that ej′ ∈ M(b). However,
ej′ strictly prefers her assigned college b to v, a contradiction
to Property (2). If dj′ ∈ U ′′, then by the definition of M ,
it follows that ej′ ∈ M(v). However, v prefers ej′ to dj′ , a
contradiction to Property (3). (of Claim 4 ⋄)
By the quotas of Y -types for v, it must hold that for each
i ∈ {r+1, . . . , 2r} at least one of {yi, yi} belongs to U
′. We
distinguish between two cases.
Case 4.1: |{yi, yi} ∩ U
′| = 2. Then, by the quotas of the Y -
types, it must hold that d /∈ U ′. Consequently, it holds
that Y ∪ Y ⊆ U ′. Moreover, for each i ∈ [r] either xi
or xi belongs to U
′. Let A := U ′ ∩ (X ∪ X). Since
3r + s + 1 = qv ≥ k′ ≥ |M(v)| = 3r + s + 1, it fol-
lows that {d′} ∪ Y ∪ Y ⊆ U ′. Moreover, by Claim 4
when we compare the students in U ′ andM(v) for Prop-
erty (3), we have to compare the students in A with
the students in X ′ because all other students remain the
same in M(v) as well as in U ′. For each literal stu-
dent lit ∈ A, if lit /∈ X ′, then it must be the case that
xi ∈ A and xi ∈ X ′ (see Property (3) in the definition
of blocking coalitions). However, xi strictly prefers her
assigned college b to v, a contradiction to Property (2).
Hence, A = X ′, i.e.,
U ′′ ∩ (X ∪X ′) = ∅. (1)
Summarizing, we have just reasoned that U ′ = M(v), a
contradiction to {v, U ′} be a blocking coalition.
Case 4.2: |{yi, yi} ∩ U
′| = 1. Then, by the quotas of the Y -
types and the type 2r + 2s+ 3, it must hold that d ∈ U ′
and d′ /∈ U ′. By the quotas of the X-types, it must also
hold that
U ′ ∩ (X ∪X) = ∅. (2)
Moreover, there exist a size-r subset Y ′ ⊆ U ′ of literal
students such that for each i ∈ {r + 1, . . . , 2r} either
S. Pref. C. Pref. LQ. UQ. C.
r1: b a w: d [F ] r2 0
2r+2s+3 12r+s+20s+1 2r + 1
r2: b w a a: r1 r2 r3 0
2r+2s+3 02r+s110s+1 1
r3: a b b: r3 r2 r1 [X ] [X] [D] [E] 1
r0r+2s+3 1r0r12s+20 r + s+ 2
d: v w v: e1 d1 . . . es ds d d
′ [{fr+1, . . . , f2r}] [Y ] [Y ] f1 x1 x1 . . . fr xi xi 1r2r3s001s+1 1r2r3s001s+1 3r+s+ 1
S. Pref. S. Pref. S. Pref. S. Pref. S. Pref.
xi: v b xi: b v fi: v w dj : v b ej: b v
Table 4: A description of the preference lists, quotas and capacities of the colleges, together with the preference lists of the students from {r1,
r2, r3, d} ∪X ∪X ∪ F ∪D ∪ E, used in the proof of Proposition 2.
yi or yi belongs to Y
′. Let Y ′′ := (Y ∪ Y ) \ Y ′. Let
σY be the truth assignment corresponding to Y
′′. Since
I is a yes instance, there exists a clause Cj which is not
1-in-3-satisfied under σX and σY , i.e.,
|Cj ∩ (X
′ ∪ Y ′′)| 6= 1. (3)
If dj ∈M(v), then |Cj ∩ (X
′∪Y ∪Y )| = 2. Moreover,
dj ∈ U ′ because of Claim 4. Since d ∈ U ′ and U ′ is
“feasible” for v regarding type 2r + j, it follows that
|Cj ∩ Y
′| = 1. Since Y ′ and Y ′′ partition Y ∪ Y it
follows that |Cj∩(X ′∪Y ′′)| = 1, a contradiction to (3).
If dj /∈ M(v), then dj /∈ U ′ due to Claim 4. Since
d ∈ U ′, to make U ′ feasible for v regarding type 2r + j
it must hold that |Cj ∩ Y ′| = 2. By (3), it follows that
|Cj∩(X ′∪Y ∪Y )| 6= 3, a contradiction to the definition
ofM that dj /∈M(v).
We have just shown the “only if” part. For the “if” part, as-
sume that I ′ admits a feasible and stable matching, calledM .
Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that I is a no instance.
First of all, we show that M(w) = d ∪ F . Suppose, for the
sake of contradiction, that M(w) 6= d ∪ F . Then, it must
hold that r2 ∈ M(w) or r2 ∈ M(b) as otherwise w forms a
blocking coalition with M(w) ∪ {r2}. If r2 ∈ M(w), then
r3 ∈ M(b) as otherwise b forms a blocking coalition with
(M(b)\{r1})∪{r2}. However, then r1 ∈M(b) as otherwise
b forms a blocking coalition withM(b)∪ {r1}. Then, a does
not receive any student and will form a blocking coalition
with {r3}, a contradiction. If r2 ∈ M(b), then neither r1 nor
r3 can be matched to b any more because of the upper quotas
regarding types 2r + s + 1 and 2r + s + 2. However, since
qa = 1, it follows that r1 or r3 will be unmatched. In the for-
mer case, a and {r1} form a blocking coalition. In the latter
case, b forms a blocking coalition with (M(b)\ {r2})∪{r3}.
This implies thatM(w) = d ∪ F . In particular, d /∈M(v).
Due to the quotas on the X-types, there exists a subset X ′
with |X ′| = r such that for each i ∈ [r] it holds that |M(v)∩
{xi, xi}| = 1 such that X ′ ⊆ M(v). In other words, X ′
corresponds to a truth assignment. Let σX be such a truth
assignment. Due to the quotas on the clause types 2r + 1
to 2r + s, there exists a subset D′ ⊆ M(v) such that D′ =
{dj ∈ D | |M(v) ∩ (X ′ ∪ Y ∪ Y )| = 2}. Moreover, by the
quotas of the types 2r+ s+3, . . . , 2r+2s+2 there exists a
subset E′ with E′ = {ej ∈ E | ej /∈ D′}.
Since I was a no instance, for the truth assignment σX
there must be a truth assignment σY for Y such that each
clause Cj is 1-in-3-satisfied. Let Y
′ := {yi | σY (yi) =
false} ∪ {yi | σY (yi) = true}. We claim that v forms a
blocking coalition with U ′ = D′ ∪ E′ ∪ {d} ∪ Y ′ ∪ F . First
of all, we verify that |D′ ∪E′ ∪ {d}∪ Y ′ ∪F | = 3r+ s+1.
Moreover, Y ∪ Y ⊆ M(v) due to the quotas of the Y -types.
Thus, each student u ∈ U ′ \ M(v) = {d} ∪ F prefers v
to her assigned college w. Further, college v prefers d to d′.
Moreover, if yi ∈ Y
′, then we can use the fact that v prefers fi
to yi; if yi ∈ Y
′ then we can use the fact that v prefers fi to yi.
College w also prefers each dummy variable student fi to xi
and xi. Hence, in order to prevent {v, U
′} from forming a
blocking coalition, there must exists a type z ∈ [2r+ 2s+3]
so that one of the quota is not satisfied. Clearly, z /∈ [2r] and
z /∈ {2r+ s+ 1, . . . , 2r+ 2s+ 3}. Thus, z corresponds to a
clause type from {2r+1, . . . , 2r+s}. Let z = 2r+ j. Then,
|Cj ∩ (Y ′ ∪D′ ∪ {d})| 6= 3. Since d has type at z it follows
that
|Cj ∩ (Y
′ ∪D′)| 6= 2. (4)
If dj ∈ D
′, then by the definition of M it must hold that
|Cj ∩ (X ′ ∪ Y ∪ Y )| = 2. Moreover, by (4) we also know
that |Cj ∩Y ′| 6= 1. Together, it follows that Cj ∩ (X ′ ∪ (Y ∪
Y ) \ Y ′)| 6= 1, a contradiction to the assumption that Cj is
1-in-3-satisfied under σX ∪ σY .
If dj /∈ D′, then by the definition of M it must hold that
|Cj ∩ (X ′ ∪ Y ∪ Y )| = 3. Together with (4) it follows that
|Cj ∩ (X ′ ∪ (Y ∪ Y ) \ Y ′)| 6= 1, again a contradiction to the
assumption that Cj is 1-in-3-satisfied under σX ∪ σY .
It remains to the show the ΣP2-containment. Similarly to
the one shown in Theorem 1. We first show that checking
whether a given matching M is not feasible or not c-stable
can be done in polynomial time: Guess a collegew and a sub-
set U ′ of students, and check in polynomial time whetherM
is not feasible or w forms a blocking coalition with U ′. This
means that there exists an NP-oracle for checking whether
a matching is not feasible or not c-stable. Then, we can
use exactly the same reasoning as the one for Theorem 1 to
show that CLASSIFIED STABLE MATCHING is in ΣP2: Guess
a matching and ask the NP-oracle whether matching is not
feasible or not c-stable; return yes if and only if the oracle
answer no.
3.2 The Impact of Diversity
The fact that SMI-DIVERSE lies in a higher complexity
class than FI-DIVERSE can be attributed to the stability con-
straints, which are not taken into account for feasible match-
ings. On the other end of the spectrum, a stable matching
without diversity constraints always exists and can be found
in polynomial time [Manlove, 2013, Chapter 3]; the corre-
sponding problem is known as the HOSPITALS/RESIDENTS
PROBLEM WITH TIES (HRT).We can pinpoint the cause of
this jump in complexity more precisely to the existence of
lower quotas, which in some sense implement affirmative ac-
tion in the SMI-DIVERSE model. Specifically, we show that
if the lower quotas are all zero, then SMTI-DIVERSE is in NP
(Theorem 2) by showing a statement which is complementary
to the coNP-hardness result in Proposition 1.
Lemma 2. If ℓ∞ = 0, then checking whether a matching is
stable can be done in O(n ·m · t) time.
Proof. Let I = (U,W, T, (x)x∈U∪W , (τu)u∈U , (qw, ℓw =
0, uw)w∈W ) be an instance of SMTI-DIVERSE where ℓw =
{0}|T | and let M be an arbitrary matching for I . To check
whether M is stable for I in polynomial time, we show that
M is stable if and only if for each unmatched pair {u,w} /∈
M with u ∈ U and w ∈ W such that u prefers w toM(u) it
holds that
τu +
∑
u′∈M(w) with u′wu
τu′ 6≤ uw; or (5)
|M(w)| = qw ∧ ∀u
′ ∈M(w) u′ w u. (6)
For the “only if” part, assume that M is stable. Suppose,
for the sake of contradiction, that there exists an unmatched
pair {u,w} /∈M with u ∈ U and w ∈ W such that u prefers
w to M(u) neither Condition (5) nor Condition (6) in the
lemma holds. Since Condition (5) does not hold, it follows
that
ℓw = 0 ≤ τu +
∑
u′∈M(w) with u′wu
τu′ ≤ uw. (7)
Define S′ := {v ∈ M(w) | u ≻w v}. We distinguish be-
tween two cases. If S′ 6= ∅, then {u,w} is blockingM since
(7) holds and replacing S′ to w results in a feasible match-
ing for w, a contradiction. If S′ = ∅, then since (6) does not
hold, it follows that |M(w)| < qw. In other words, {u,w} is
blockingM since (7) holds, |M(w) \S′| < qw and replacing
S′ to w results in a feasible matching for w, a contradiction.
For the “if” part, assume that Condition (5) or Condi-
tion (6) holds for each unmatched pair {u,w} /∈ M with u
preferringw toM(u). Suppose, for the sake of contradiction
that, M is not stable. Let {u,w} be a blocking pair of M .
That is, {u,w} /∈M , u prefers w toM(u), and there exists a
(possibly empty) subset of students S ⊆M(w) assigned tow
such that
(i) w prefers u strictly to every student in S,
(ii) ℓw ≤ τu +
∑
u′∈M(w)\S τu′ ≤ uw, and
(iii) |M(w) \ S|+ 1 ≤ qw.
Let S′ := {u′ ∈ M(w) | u′ w u}. Then, by Condition (i),
it follows that S′ ⊆ M(w) \ S. By Condition (ii), it follows
that
τu +
∑
u′∈S′
τu′ ≤ τu +
∑
u′∈M(w)\S
τu′ ≤ uw,
implying that Condition (5) does not hold. By our assump-
tion, Condition (6) must hold. In other words, |M(w)| = qw
and S = ∅, a contradiction to Condition (iii).
Using the above equivalent formulation, one can go
through each student u ∈ U and each college w ∈ W with
w ≻u M(u) and check in O(t) time whether Condition (5)
or Condition (6) holds. This gives the promised running
time.
From Lemma 2, we immediately obtain:
Proposition 3. SMTI-DIVERSE and SMI-DIVERSE re-
stricted to instances where ℓ∞ = 0 are in NP.
Proof. To show NP membership, one only needs to guess in
polynomial time a matchingM , and check whetherM is fea-
sible in polynomial time, and whether it is stable in polyno-
mial time, using Lemma 2.
Even though with zero lower quotas SMTI-DIVERSE is
in NP, and thus can be considered significantly easier than
SMTI-DIVERSE in general, it is actually hard within NP.
Hardness for this case was claimed in [Aziz et al., 2019,
Proposition 5.3]. However their reduction contains a tech-
nical flaw. Interested readers can refer to Observation 1 for
details.
Observation 1. [Aziz et al., 2019, Lemma 5.7] which is used
to prove [Aziz et al., 2019, Proposition 5.3] is incorrect. In
fact, even the construction in the proof of [Aziz et al., 2019,
Proposition 5.3] is incorrect. In particular, the instance con-
structed in that proof is always a yes instance, independent of
the original 3-SAT instance.
Proof. To see this, define the matching M for
their produced instance as follows (notations
taken from that proof): First, let Let MF :=
{(si1, c
i
t1
), (si2, c
i
2), (s
i
3, c
i
1), (s
i
4, c
i
1), (s
i
5, c
i
t2
), (si6, c
i
2), (f
i
1,
cif1), (f
i
2, c
i
f2
) | i ∈ [k]}. Note that MF =⋃
i∈[k] X
i
F \ {(t
i
1, o(t
i
1)), (t
i
2, o(t
i
2)) | i ∈ [k]}. For
each j ∈ [l], let Sj be the set consisting of the first two (if
there are fewer than two, then all) students of the form tiz
(i ∈ [k], z ∈ [2]) appearing in the preferences of oj . For
instance, if Cj = (x1 ∧ x2 ∧ x3), where Cj is the second
clause where x2 appears as a true literal and the first clause
where x3 appears as a true literal, then Sj = {t22, t
3
1}. One
can verify thatM :=MF∪{(s, oj) | j∈[l]∧s∈Sj} is feasible
and stable for the constructed instance in that proof.
Below, we use Lemma 1 to provide a new NP-hardness
proof for the case when there are no lower quotas.
Theorem 2. For ℓ∞ = 0, SMI-DIVERSE is NP-complete; it
remains NP-hard even if ℓ∞ = 0, u∞ = 1 and t = q∞ = 2.
Proof. The containment for the case with ℓ∞ = 0 follows
from Proposition 3. To show the NP-hardness, we reduce
from (2,2)-3SAT, an NP-complete variant [Berman et al.,
2003] of 3SAT where each literal x ∈ X ∪ X appears pre-
cisely two times in the set φ(X) = (C1, C2, . . . , Cs) of
clauses.
S. Pref. T. C. Pref. UQ. C.
xi : piwi 10 wi : xi u
1
i yi u
2
i 11 2
yi : wi pi 01 pi : yi v
1
i xi v
2
i 11 2
u1i : wi c[u
1
i ] 11
u2i : wi c[u
2
i ] 00
v1i : pi c[v
1
i ] 11
v2i : pi c[v
2
i ] 00
r1 : b a 10 cj : s
1[cj ] s
2[cj ] s
3[cj ] r2 11 1
r2 : b [C] a 11 a : r1 r2 r3 11 1
r3 : a b 01 b : r3 r2 r1 11 2
Table 5: The types and the preference lists of the students and the
colleges are as follows where we omit “≻” to save space, let i ∈ [r]
and j ∈ [s], and let [C] := c1 ≻ · · · ≻ cs, “S.”, “Pref.”, “T.”, “C.”,
“UQ.”, and “C.” stand for “student”, “preference list”, “type vector”,
“college”, “upper quota”, and capacity, respectively.
Given an instance I = (X = {x1, . . . , xr}, φ(X) =
{C1, . . . , Cs}) of (2,2)-3SAT, we construct an instance of
SMI-DIVERSE as follows. For each clause Cj ∈ φ(X), in-
troduce a clause college cj . For each variable xi ∈ X , in-
troduce two variable students, called xi and yi, four literal
students, called u1i , u
2
i , v
1
i , and v
2
i , and two variable colleges,
called wi and pi. Finally, introduce three special students,
called r1, r2, r3, and two special colleges, called a and b. Let
there be two types; i.e., T = {1, 2}.
For ease of description of the preference lists we use the
following notation: let c[uzi ] and c[v
z
i ], (z ∈ [2]) be the clause
student cj such that the clause Cj contains the z
th occurrence
of literal xi and xi, respectively. Further, let s
z′ [cj ] (z
′ ∈ [3])
denote the literal student that corresponds to the z′
th
literal
appearing in clause Cj . For instance, if Cj = (x2, x3, x5)
and the occurrence of x2 inCj is its second one, then s
1[cj ] =
v22 . All lower quotas are defined as zero. This completes
the construction of the instance for SMI-DIVERSE. One can
verify the restrictions stated in the theorem.
It remains to show that (X,φ(X)) admits a satisfying truth
assignment if and only if the constructed instance admits a
feasible and stable matching.
For the “only if” part, let the truth assignment σX satisfy
φ(X). We claim that the following matching M is feasible
and stable for the constructed SMI-DIVERSE instance.
• For each variable xi ∈ X , if σX(xi) = true let
M(wi) := {xi, yi} and M(pi) := {v1i , v
2
i }, and oth-
erwise letM(wi) := {u1i , u
2
i } andM(pi) := {xi, yi}.
• For each clause Cj ∈ φ(X), let M(cj) := {sz(cj)},
where z ∈ [3] is the smallest index such that the zth lit-
eral inCj is set to true under σX ; note that there exists at
least one such literal since σX is a satisfying assignment.
• LetM(a) := {r2} andM(b) := {r1, r3}.
It is straightforward to verify that M is feasible. To show
stability, assume for contradiction that there is some block-
ing pair {α, β} for M with β ∈ {wi, pi | i ∈ [r]} ∪ {cj ∈
j ∈ [s]} ∪ {a, b}. Let this be witnessed by S′ ⊆ M(β).
Observe that {uzi , v
z
i | i ∈ [r], z ∈ [2]} ⊎ {r1, r2, r3} and
{cj | j ∈ [s]} ∪ {a, b} correspond to exactly the situation
in Lemma 1, apart from the fact that the students u1i and v
1
i
have both special types. Note however that the fact that stu-
dents in U \ {r1, r2, r3} do not have the two types consid-
ered in Lemma 1, is not used in the proof of Lemma 1(1)
at all. By Lemma 1(1) and by the definition of M , it fol-
lows that α ∈ {xi, yi, u1i , u
2
i , v
1
i , v
2
i } for some i ∈ [r]. If
α = xi, then, as M(xi) 6= ⊥, it follows that β = pi and
M(pi) = {v1i , v
2
i }. Since pi already receives two students
and prefers xi to only v
2
i it follows that S
′ = {v2i }. However,
replacing {v2i } with xi exceeds the quota regarding type 1,
a contradiction. Similarly, we infer that α 6= yi. Next, if
α = u1i , then β ∈ {wi, c[u
1
i ]}. We distinguish between two
cases:
(i) If β = wi, then M(wi) = {xi, yi}. Since wi already
receives two students and prefers u1i to only yi (among
all students assigned to wi) it follows that S
′ = {yi}.
However, replacing {yi} with u1i exceeds the quota re-
garding type 1, a contradiction.
(ii) If β = c[u1i ], then there exists some clause Cj such that
c[u1i ] = cj . By the definition ofM there exists another
literal student sz[cj ] who is assigned to cj such that cj
prefers sz[cj ] to u
1
i , a contradiction.
Similarly, we infer contradiction for the case that α ∈
{u2i , v
1
i , v
2
i }. As all cases lead to a contradiction, there is no
blocking pair {α, β}, thusM is stable.
For the “if” part, let M be a feasible and stable matching
for the constructed SMI-DIVERSE instance. Define the fol-
lowing assignment σX with σX(xi) := true if there exists
a clause college cj such that u
1
i or u
2
i is assigned to cj ; let
σX(xi) := false if there exists a clause college cj such that
v1i or v
2
i is assigned to cj . If no such clause college exists,
then the truth value of xi can be arbitrary; for instance, let
σX(xi) = true.
We show that σX is well-defined, i.e., for each vari-
able xi there exist no two clause colleges cj and cj′ with
M(cj)∩ {u1i , u
1
i } 6= ∅ andM(cj′)∩ {v
1
i , v
2
i } 6= ∅. Suppose,
for the sake of contradiction, that cj and cj′ are two clause
colleges such that M(cj) = {uzi } and M(cj′) = {v
z′
i } for
some i ∈ [r] and z, z′ ∈ [2]. We distinguish two cases: If
xi ∈ M(wi), then yi ∈ M(pi) as otherwise v
z′
i forms a
blocking pair with pi. By the upper quotas of pi it follows
that v1i /∈ M(pi). However then xi forms a blocking pair
with pi, a contradiction. If xi /∈ M(wi), then u1i ∈ M(wi)
because otherwise u1i forms a blocking pair with wi. By the
upper quotas of wi it follows that yi /∈M(wi). Then, it must
hold that u2i ∈ M(wi) because otherwise u
2
i forms a block-
ing pair with wi. This is a contradiction toM(cj) = u
z
i with
z ∈ [2].
Finally, we show that σX satisfies (X,φ(X)). As observed
earlier, {uzi , v
z
i | i ∈ [r], z ∈ [2]} ⊎ {r1, r2, r3} and {cj | j ∈
[s]} ⊎ {a, b} correspond to exactly the situation in Lemma 1,
except for the types of the students u1i and v
1
i . Note that the
fact that all students in U \ {r1, r2, r3} have no types is only
used in the proof of Lemma 1(2) to show that if |M(w)∩(U \
{r1, r2, r3})| < qw and r2 /∈M(w) for any w ∈ W \ {a, b},
{r2, w} is blocking. As in this case for all w ∈ {cj | j ∈
[s]}, qw = 1, this is obviously still the case, independently of
the types of the u1i and v
1
i students. By Lemma 1(2) and by
the capacities of the clause colleges, it follows that for each
clause Cj there exists a literal lit
z
j ∈ Cj such that M(cj) =
{sz[cj ]}, and thus under σX there is a true literal for each
clause.
We note that the reduction behind Theorem 2 can be adapted
to show NP-hardness for FI-DIVERSE, even with three types.
Proposition 4. FI-DIVERSE remains NP-hard even if t = 3,
u∞ = 1, q∞ = 2.
Proof. We show how to modify the SMI-DIVERSE instance
constructed in the proof of Theorem 2: We delete the special
students r1, r2, r3 and the special colleges a and b as they are
only relevant if stability is required. Instead, we introduce
one more type, to enforce that each clause college is matched
to at least one student. All students have this new third type
in addition to the ones described in the construction of the
proof of Theorem 2. All clause colleges have lower quo-
tas (0, 0, 1) and upper quotas (1, 1, 1). All variable colleges
have the same lower quotas as upper quotas, namely (1, 1, 2).
The capacities and acceptable pairs remain the same as in the
previous construction (except for those involving the deleted
special students or special colleges).
It is straightforward to verify that the matching constructed
from a satisfying truth assignment in the proof of Theorem 2,
is also feasible for the modified SMI-DIVERSE instance. For
the reverse direction, ifM is a feasible matching in the mod-
ified instance, we claim that the truth assignment as in the
proof of Theorem 2 is a valid and satisfying assignment. To
see this, we first observe that, similarly as in the proof of
Theorem 2, each clause college cj receives exactly one lit-
eral student. This means that if σX is a valid truth assign-
ment, then it must satisfy each clause Cj . It remains to show
that σX is a valid assignment. Suppose, for the sake of con-
tradiction, that that cj and cj′ are two clause colleges such
that M(cj) = {uzi } and M(cj′) = {v
z′
i } for some i ∈ [r]
and z, z′ ∈ [2]. We distinguish two cases: If xi ∈ M(wi),
then yi ∈M(wi) as otherwise the lower quota for college wi
and type 2 cannot be fulfilled without exceeding wi’s upper
quota for type 1. This means M(pi) = {v
1
i , v
2
i } as oth-
erwise pi’s quotas are not fulfilled. This is a contradiction
to M(cj′ ) = v
z′
i with z
′ ∈ [2]. If xi /∈ M(wi), then
M(wi) = {u1i , u
2
i } because of the lower and upper quotas
for pi regarding types 1 and 2. This is a contradiction to
M(cj) = u
z
i with z ∈ [2].
Note that all our hardness proofs from Theorem 1 and cases
where ℓ∞ = 0 are tight in the sense that we show complete-
ness in ΣP2 and NP respectively for these cases (Theorem 1
and Proposition 3 respectively). Similarly containment in NP
is known for FI-DIVERSE. Thus these are the strongest hard-
ness results one can achieve in terms of levels of the polyno-
mial hierarchy. We are also able to showNP-completeness for
the NP-hard fragments of SMI-DIVERSE, which are notΣP2 -
hard and for which it does not necessarily hold that ℓ∞ = 0.
Specifically for SMI-DIVERSE where the number of types,
the maximum upper quota and/or the maximum capacity are
bounded, the following observation closes the gap between
hardness and completeness.
Observation 2. If t or q∞ is a constant, then SMTI-
DIVERSE is in NP.
Proof. Notice that the size of a minimumwitness for a block-
ing pair never exceeds t or q∞:
• each student has at most t types and hence at most t
students have to be removed to make space in terms of
upper quotas; and
• a witnessing set is a subset matched to a single college,
which is by definition never larger than q∞.
Hence, given a matching M , one can check in polynomial
time whether it admits no blocking pair—one can enumer-
ate all unmatched pairs and all potential witnesses and check
if they describe a blocking pair. This suffices to show NP-
containment.
3.3 The Case with Few Colleges
The NP-hardness reduction behind Theorem 2 produces a
college gadget for each variable in order to maintain as few
types as possible. This leads to the question of whether the
problem remains NP-hard for few colleges. The following
theorem answers the question affirmatively. The idea is to re-
duce from the INDEPENDENT SET problem [Garey and John-
son, 1979] and introduce types corresponding to the vertices
and the edges in an input graph, and students corresponding
to the vertices such that the students assigned to a special col-
lege w must correspond to an independent set. As before, we
use Lemma 1 to enforce that w receives at least some given
number of students.
Theorem 3. SMI-DIVERSE isNP-hard even ifm = 4, ℓ∞ =
0 and u∞ = 2.
Proof. We provide a polynomial-time reduc-
tion from the following NP-complete INDEPEN-
DENT SET problem [Garey and Johnson, 1979].
INDEPENDENT SET
Input: An undirected graphG = (V,E)with V being the
vertex set and E being the edge set, and an integer k ≥ 0.
Question: Does G admit a size-at-least-k independent
set V ′ ⊆ V (i.e., for each edge e ∈ E it holds that
|V ′ ∩ e| ≤ 1)?
Let (G = (V,E), k) be an instance of INDEPENDENT SET.
Let V := {v1, . . . , vn′} and E := {e1, . . . , em′}. We con-
struct the following instance for SMI-DIVERSE.
The types. We consider 2n′ +m′ + 2 types: For each ver-
tex vi ∈ V , there are two corresponding vertex types. For
each edge ej , there is a corresponding edge type. Besides
this, there are two special types; which will be the ones used
to incorporate the gadget from Lemma 1.
The students. We consider 4n′ + 3 students: For each ver-
tex vi ∈ V , there are two vertex students, called vi, ui, and
two corresponding dummy students, called xi, yi. The types
of these students are as follows:
∀j ∈ [2n′] : τvi [j] :=
{
1, if j = 2i− 1,
0, otherwise,
τui [j] :=
{
1, if j = 2i,
0, otherwise,
τxi [j] := τyi [j] :=
{
1, if j ∈ {2i− 1, 2i},
0, otherwise.
∀j ∈ [m+ 2]: τvi [2n+ j] :=
{
1, if ej ∈ E and vi ∈ ej ,
0, otherwise.
τui [2n
′ + j] := τxi [2n
′ + j] := τyi [2n
′ + j] := 0.
For an illustration, assume that G contains four vertices and
five edges, with vertex v1 being incident to edge e2 and e4.
Then the types of the four students v1, u1, x1, and y1 corre-
sponding to vertex v1 are:
τv1 :=10 00 00 00 01010 00,
τu1 :=01 00 00 00 00000 00,
τx1 :=11 00 00 00 00000 00,
τy1 :=11 00 00 00 00000 00.
There are three special students, r1, r2, r3.
τr1 := {0}
2n′+m′10, τr2 := {0}
2n′+m′11, τr3 := {0}
2n′+m′01.
The colleges. We consider four colleges w, p, a, b. The ca-
pacities and the upper quotas of the colleges are as follows
while the lower quotas are set to zero.
• qw := n′ + k, qp := 2n′ − k, qa := 1, and qb := 2.
• uw := {1}2n
′+m′+2, up := {1}2n
′
{2}m
′
00, ua :=
{0}2n
′+m′11, and ub := {0}2n
′+m′11.
The preferences of the students and colleges. The prefer-
ence lists are defined as follows.
S. Pref. C. Pref.
r1 : b a a : r1 r2 r3
r2 : b w a b : r3 r2 r1
r3 : a b
vi : w p, w : u1 x1 v1 · · · un xn vn r2
ui : pw, p : v1 y1 u1 · · · vn yn un
xi : w,
yi : p,
This completes the construction, which clearly can be car-
ried out in polynomial time. It is straightforward to verify
that ℓ∞ = 0, u∞ = 2, andm = 4.
We claim that graphG = (V,E) admits an independent set
of size at least k if and only if the constructed SMI-DIVERSE
instance admits a feasible and stable matching.
For the “only if” part, assume that (G = (V,E), k) is a
yes instance and let V ′ ⊆ V be an independent set of size
exactly k. We show that the following matchingM with
M(w) :={vi, ui | vi ∈ V
′} ∪ {xi | vi ∈ V \ V
′},
M(p) :={vi, ui | vi ∈ V \ V
′} ∪ {yi | vi ∈ V
′},
M(f) :={y}, andM(g) := {x, z}
is feasible and stable. It is straightforward to check that M
is feasible for colleges a and b. M is also feasible for col-
lege p since each edge type is “incident” to exactly two vertex
students from V . Similarly,M is also feasible for college w
since V ′ is an independent set, meaning that for each edge ej ,
at most one vertex student from V ′ has edge type 2n′ + j.
It remains to show that M is stable. Assume for contradic-
tion, thatM is not stable, i.e., there is a blocking pair {α, β}
for M . Let S′ ⊆ M(β) witness this. First, we observe that
regarding the types 2n′ + m′ + 1 and 2n′ + m′ + 2, the
students {ui, xi, vi | i ∈ [n′]} ⊎ {r1, r2, r3} and the col-
leges {w} ⊎ {a, b} correspond exactly to the students and
colleges discussed in Lemma 1. By Lemma 1(1), it follows
that α /∈ {r1, r2, r3} and β /∈ {a, b}. Hence, we infer that
α ∈ {vi, ui, xi, yi | i ∈ [n′]} and β ∈ {w, p}. We distinguish
four cases:
• If α = xi for some i ∈ [n′], then β = w. By the con-
struction of M it follows that {vi, ui} ⊆ M(w). Since
τxi [2i − 1] = τxi [2i] = 1 and since besides vi and ui,
no student assigned to w has type 2i − 1 or 2i, it fol-
lows that {vi, ui} ⊆ S′. However, w prefers ui to xi, a
contradiction to {xi, w} being a blocking pair.
• Similarly, we obtain a contradiction for the case when
α = yi with i ∈ [n′].
• If α = vi for some i ∈ [n
′], then β = w. By the
construction of M , it follows that xi ∈ M(w) and
ui /∈M(w). Since τvi [2i− 1] = 1 and since besides xi,
no student assigned to w has type 2i− 1, it follows that
xi ∈ S′. However, w prefers xi to vi, a contradiction to
{vi, w} being a blocking pair.
• Similarly, we obtain a contradiction for the case when
α = ui with i ∈ [n′].
As every case leads to a contradiction, there is no blocking
pair {α, β}. Thus,M is indeed stable.
Now, we turn the “if” part and assume that the constructed
SMI-DIVERSE instance admits a feasible and stable match-
ingM . Let V ′ := {vi | i ∈ [n′] ∧ vi ∈ M(w)}, U ′ := {ui |
i ∈ [n′] ∧ ui ∈M(w)}, X ′ := {xi | i ∈ [n′] ∧ xi ∈M(w)}.
We aim to show that V ′ is an independent set of size at least k.
Clearly, V ′ is an independent set because of w’s upper quo-
tas for the edge types. It remains to show that V ′ has size at
least k. Before we show this, we first observe the following
for the sizes of V ′, U ′, andX ′.
Claim 5. (1) It holds that |V ′|+ |U ′|+ |X ′| = n+ k.
(2) It holds that |V ′| ≥ k.
Proof. Statement (1) follows directly from Lemma 1(2) ap-
plied to {ui, xi, vi | i ∈ [n′]}⊎{r1, r2, r3} and {w}∪{a, b}.
Statement (2): First, observe that for each i ∈ [n′] it
must hold that xi ∈ X ′ if and only if ui /∈ U ′ because
of the upper quota of w regarding type 2i. This implies
that |X ′| + |U ′| ≤ n′. By Statement (5) it follows that
|V ′| ≥ k. (of Claim 5) ⋄
Now, it is straightforward to see that |V ′| = k follows from
Claim 5(2).
4 Algorithmic Results
This section provides the algorithmic results that together al-
low us to complete Table 2.
4.1 SMTI-DIVERSE with few students
In this section, we deal with the case where there are few
number of students. For simplicity of notation, given a
type z ∈ T , we let U τz := {ui ∈ U | τui [z] = 1} be the
set of all students who have type z. We omit the superscript τ
if the type vectors τ are clear from the context.
Theorem 4. SMTI-DIVERSE admits a problem kernel with
n students, n2 + n colleges, and 2n types, and can be solved
in O(n ·m · t+ 2n · (2n+ 1)n · n2 · t) time.
Proof. We first show how to preprocess an
SMTI-DIVERSE instance I = (U,W, T, (u
, τu)u∈U , (qw, ℓw, uw)w∈W to obtain an instance
(U,W ′, T ′, (′u, τ
′
u)u∈U , (q
′
w, ℓ
′
w, u
′
w)w∈W ) with n stu-
dents, n2 + n colleges and 2n types which is equivalent in
terms of the existence of a feasible and stable matching. This
then suffices to solve the instance in the claimed running
time via an exhaustive brute-force procedure.
Upper-bounding the number of types. We first show that
the number of types can be reduced to at most 2n. To achieve
this, we observe that if there are two types z, z′ ∈ T which are
possessed by exactly the same subset of students, i.e., U τz =
U τz′ , then each student u has type z if and only if she has
type z′. This implies that the lower-quota (resp. the upper-
quota) on z must also be a lower-quota (resp. an upper-quota)
on z′ and vice versa.
By the above observation, we can group types z together
which belong to exactly the same subset Uz and update the
lower-quotas and upper-quotas for each college accordingly.
Formally, let F := {U τz | z ∈ T } denote the family of sub-
sets of students defined according to the original types and
let f : |F| → F be an arbitrary but fixed bijection. The “re-
duced” set of types is defined as T ∗ := |F|. The new type
vector τ∗u of each student u ∈ U is defined as follows:
∀z ∈ T ∗ : τ∗u [z] := 1 if and only if u ∈ f(z).
Clearly, for each z ∈ T ∗ it holds that U τz = U
τ∗
z .
The new lower-quotas and upper-quotas of each col-
lege w ∈W are defined as follows:
∀z ∈ T ∗ : ℓ∗w[z] := max
z′∈T with Uτ
z′
=f(z)
ℓw[z
′] and
u∗w[z] := min
z′∈T with Uτ
z′
=f(z)
ℓw[z
′].
Now, we show that I and the reduced instance I∗ =
(U,W, (x)x∈U∪W , (τ∗ui)ui∈U , (qwj , ℓ
∗
wj
, u∗wj )wj∈W ) are
equivalent by showing that every matching is feasible and
stable for I if and only if it is also feasible and stable for I∗.
For the “only if” part, letM be a feasible and stable match-
ing of I . Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that M is
not feasible or not stable for I∗. If M is not feasible for I∗,
then since the capacity bounds are not changed, there must
be a college w ∈ W and a type z ∈ T ∗ such that either
|M(w) ∩ U τ
∗
z | < ℓ
∗
w[z] or |M(w) ∩ U
τ∗
z | > u
∗
w[z]. We only
consider the case when |M(w) ∩ U τ
∗
z | < ℓ
∗
w[z]; the other
case where the upper-quota is violated is analogous. Now,
if |M(w) ∩ U τ
∗
z | < ℓ
∗
w[z], then since U
τ
z = U
τ∗
z , by the
definition of ℓ∗w[z], there is an original type z
′ ∈ T with
U τz′ = U
τ∗
z such that ℓ
∗
w[z] = ℓw[z]. Together, we derive
that |M(w) ∩ U τz′ | = |M(w) ∩ U
τ∗
z | < ℓ
∗
w[z] = ℓw[z], a
contradiction toM being feasible for I .
Now, suppose, for the sake of contradiction, thatM is not
stable for I∗. This means that there exists an unmatched
pair {u,w} /∈M with u ∈ U and w ∈W such that
(1) u prefers w toM(u) and w prefers u toM(w), and
(2) there exists a subset U ′ ⊆ M(w) of students assigned
to w, where w prefers u to U ′, and M ∪ {{u,w}} \
({{u,M(u)} ∪ {u′, w}u′∈U ′}) remains feasible for w,
regarding τ∗, ℓ∗w, and u
∗
w.
Since M is stable for I , it must hold that M ∪ {{u,w}} \
({{u,M(u)} ∪ {u′, w}u′∈U ′}) is not feasible for I as other-
wise {u,w} is also blockingM in I . By a similar reasoning
as above, we can show thatM ∪ {{u,w}} \ ({{u,M(u)}}∪
{u′, w}u′∈U ′}) is also not feasible for I ′, a contradiction.
Upper-bounding the length of the preference list of each
student. We have just shown that I∗ is equivalent to I and
has at most 2n types. Next, we show that the number of col-
leges in each student’s preference list is upper-bounded by a
function in (n, t). We consider colleges with at least one non-
zero lower-quota and with all-zero lower-quotas separately.
Let W>0 be the set of all colleges with at least one non-zero
lower-quota for some type. Observe that each college inW>0
must be assigned at least one student. Then, for any ‘yes’-
instance it must hold that |W>0| ≤ n as otherwise no feasible
matching exists because at least one college fromW>0 is not
assigned any student. Thus, we obtain the following.
Claim 6. If I is a yes instance, then |W>0| ≤ n.
We also observe that no feasible matching will assign a
student u to a college w which cannot accommodate u:
Claim 7. For each student u and each acceptable col-
lege w ∈ A(u) if uw 6≥ τu, then no feasible matching can
assign w to u.
Next, we turn to the set of colleges with all-zero lower-
quotas, denoted as W=0. Consider an arbitrary student u ∈
U . Although the length of u’s preference list u can be un-
bounded, we show in the following that we only need to con-
sider at most n colleges from W=0. We introduce one more
notation. Let Wu := {w ∈ W=0 ∩ A(u) | uw ≥ τu} de-
note a set consisting of all acceptable colleges from W=0
whose upper-quotas are large enough to accommodate stu-
dent u alone. Now, observe that if there exists a stable match-
ingM where some college w ∈ Wu hasM(w) = ∅, thenM
must assign to u some college w′ which is either preferred to
or tied with w by student u as otherwise u and w will form
a blocking pair. In other words, we only need to go through
the colleges fromWu in order≻∗u of the preference listu of
u (we break ties arbitrarily) and select the first n ones. For-
mally, let
W ′u := {w ∈Wu | |{w
′ ∈Wu | w
′ ≻∗u w}| < n}.
We claim that it suffices to consider the colleges fromW ′u by
showing the following.
Claim 8. If there exists a feasible and stable matching which
assigns to student u a college fromWu \W ′u, then there exists
a feasible and stable matching which assigns to student u a
college fromW ′u.
Proof of Claim 8. Let M be a feasible and stable matching.
Assume that there exists a college w ∈ Wu \ W ′u with
M(u) = w. This implies that |W ′u| = n and there ex-
ists a college w′ ∈ W ′u which does not receive any student.
Since M is stable, it must hold that w and w′ are tied by u
as otherwise u will form a blocking pair with w′, because
M(w′) = ∅ and w′ has enough upper-quotas to accommo-
date student u alone, a contradiction toM being stable. Then,
it is straightforward to check that the modified matchingM ′
withM ′ := M \{{u,w}}∪{{u,w′}} is a feasible and stable
matching; note thatM ′ is also feasible forw asw has all-zero
lower-quotas. ⋄
By the above observations, we can restrict the preference
list of each student u to only the colleges from
(
A(ui) ∩
W=0
)
∪ W ′u; note that we only “ignore” colleges with all-
zero lower-quotas and colleges which cannot “accommodate”
student u. We update the preference lists of the colleges ac-
cordingly. If some college obtains empty preference list after
the update, then we can simply delete it as it will never be
assigned a student by any feasible and stable matching. Sum-
marizing, we obtain a new equivalent instance with n stu-
dents, at most 2n types, and at most n2 + n colleges.
The running time for the preprocessing. It remains to an-
alyze the running time. The modification of the types and the
type vectors of all students can be done in O(n · t) time. The
modification of the lower-quotas and upper-quotas of all col-
leges can be done in O(m · t) time. The modification of the
preference list of each student can be done in linear time by
using an integer counter. For each student u, we go through
the colleges from A(u) in order of the preferences of u (we
break ties arbitrarily). Let w be the college currently consid-
ered. If uw 6≥ τu, then we delete the acceptable pair {u,w}.
Here, deleting a pair {x, y}means deleting x from the prefer-
ence list of y and y from the preference list of x. Otherwise,
if there is no integer counter cu,w for w, then keep col-
lege w in the list and create a counter cu and set it to one.
Otherwise, if cu < n, then also keep collegew and increment
counter cu,w by one; otherwise, delete the pair {u,w}. In
this way, we can modify the preference lists of the students
in O(n ·m · t) time.
Solving the original instance. First, We perform the de-
scribed preprocessing in O(n ·m · t) time. Then, we branch
on the at most (2n + 1)n possible ways to assign colleges
to the students for the instance obtained from preprocessing;
note that after preprocessing, each student u has at most 2n
colleges (n fromW>0 and n fromW
′
u) in her preference list.
For each of the O((2n + 1)n) possible matchings, we check
feasibility and stability. Since each matching contains at most
n pairs, feasibility can be checked inO(n·t) time. Recall that
each student has at most 2n relevant colleges in her prefer-
ence lists. Thus, to check stability, we go through all O(2n2)
unmatched pairs, say {u,w}, and all possible subsets of stu-
dents 2n assigned to w and all types z ∈ [t]. This can be
done in O(2n2 · 2n · t) time. The overall running time is
O(n ·m · t+ 2n · (2n+ 1)n · n2 · t).
4.2 SMTI-DIVERSE with few colleges and small
maximum capacity
Next, we show that SMTI-DIVERSE can be solved in polyno-
mial time if the numberm of colleges and the maximum ca-
pacity q∞ of all colleges are constants, using a simple brute-
forcing algorithm based on the following observation.
Observation 3. Every feasible matching can assign colleges
to at mostm · q∞ students.
By the above observation, we only need to guess a subset
of at most m · q∞ students which are assigned to colleges,
and branch for each student in the guessed set on the choice
of one out ofm possible colleges. For each branch, we check
feasibility and stability in O(2q∞ · n ·m · t) time since each
college obtains at most q∞ students (see Observation 2).
Proposition 5. SMTI-DIVERSE and FI-DIVERSE can be
solved in O(nm·q∞ · (m · q∞)m · 2q∞ · n ·m · t) time.
Proof. We only consider SMTI-DIVERSE as the algorithm
for FI-DIVERSE works the same except in the checking
phase we only need to check feasibility instead of both
feasibility and stability. Let I = (U,W, T, (u, τu)u∈U ,
(qw, ℓw, uw)w∈W ) be an instance of SMTI-DIVERSE. The
algorithm behind SMTI-DIVERSE works as follows. For
each subset U ′ ⊆ U of at most m · q∞ and for each possible
matchingM where each u ∈ U ′ is assigned to some w ∈W ,
and M(u) = ⊥ for all u ∈ U \ U ′, we check whether the
feasibility conditions and the stability condition holds:
(1) |M(w)| ≤ q∞ for all w ∈W ,
(2) ℓw ≤
∑
u∈M(w) τu ≤ uw for all w ∈W , and
(3) for each unmatched student-college pair {u,w} where
u /∈M(w) and u prefers w toM(u) and for each (possi-
bly empty) subset S ⊆ M(w) such that w to prefers u
to every student in S there exists a type z ∈ T with
τu[z] +
∑
u′∈M(w)\S τu′ [z] < ℓw[z] or with τu[z] +∑
u′∈M(w)\S τu′ [z] > uw[z].
We return “yes” by accepting M as a feasible and stable
matching for I as soon as we found a matching fulfilling the
above conditions, whereas we return “no” if no such match-
ing is found. To see the correctness, clearly, if our algo-
rithm returns “yes” by accepting a specific matchingM , then
M stable and feasible. Now, if I is a yes instance and ad-
mits a feasible and stable matching M , then let U ′ denote
the subset of students which are assigned colleges underM ,
i.e., U ′ := {u ∈ U | M(u) ∈ W}. By Observation 3,
|U ′| ≤ m · q∞. Thus, our algorithm must have considered
the subset U ′ and the matchingM . Since M is feasible and
stable it satisfies Conditions (1)–(3). Thus, when our algo-
rithm returns “yes”, latest by acceptingM .
It remains to analyze the running time. First of all, since
|U ′| ≤ m · q∞, there are O(nm·q∞ · (m · q∞)m) match-
ings to test for Conditions (1)–(3). Next, for each consid-
ered matching M , testing the feasibility Conditions (1)–(2)
can obviously be done in O(m · n · t) time. Finally, testing
the stability conditions can be done in O(2q∞ ·m · n · t) time
since there are at most n ·m unmatched student-college pairs
and each college in the pair has at most q∞ students.
Note that for FI-DIVERSE, we only need to check Condi-
tions (1)–(3).
4.3 SMTI-DIVERSE with few colleges and types
In this section, we show that for few number of colleges and
types, both FI-DIVERSE and SMTI-DIVERSE can be solved
in polynomial time. For FI-DIVERSE, we observe that among
all students with the same type vector and the same acceptable
set of colleges, it does not matter which student of them is
matched to a college as long as the lower quotas and upper
quotas are fulfilled. In other words, all students with the same
type vector and acceptable set can be grouped together and
treated as the same. This allows us to express FI-DIVERSE
as an ILP of small size.
Lemma 3. FI-DIVERSE can be expressed as an integer lin-
ear program with O(m · 2m · 2t) variables which take values
of at most n, andO(n ·m+ t ·m) inequalities.
Proof. Before we describe the ILP formulation, we introduce
some notation. For each type vector τ ∈ {0, 1}t and each
subsetA ⊆W such there there exists a student uwith τu = τ
and A(u) = A, let Sτ,A denote the set of students with type
vector τ and acceptable set A:
Sτ,A := {u ∈ U | τu = τ ∧ A(u) = A}.
Note that the sets Sτ,A partition the whole set U of students
and for each w ∈ W it holds that either Sτ,A ⊆ A(w) or
Sτ,A ∩ A(w) = ∅ because of the symmetry of the acceptabil-
ity. Further, there are at most min(n, 2t · 2m) such sets, and
they can be pre-computed in polynomial time: go through
each student u add her to the corresponding set Sτu,A(A) if
such set already exists; otherwise let Sτu,A(A) := {u}.
Next, for each college w and each non-empty set Sτ,A
with A ⊆ A(w), introduce an integer variable xw,τ,A; the
value xw,τ,A will be exactly the number of students with type
vector τ and acceptable set A that shall be assigned to w in a
feasible matching. Now we are ready to state the ILP formu-
lation, where the expression “Sτ,A ⊆ A(w)” means taking all
non-empty sets Sτ,A (as described above) with Sτ,A ⊆ A(w):
xw,τ,A ≥ 0, ∀w ∈ W, ∀Sτ,A : Sτ,A ⊆ A(w), (8)∑
w∈W
xw,τ,A ≤ |Sτ,A|, ∀Sτ,A : Sτ,A ⊆ A(w), (9)
∑
Sτ,A⊆A(w)
xw,τ,A ≤ qw, ∀w ∈ W, (10)
∑
Sτ,A⊆A(w) :
τ [z]=1
xw,τ,A ≥ ℓw[z], ∀w ∈ W, ∀z ∈ [t], (11)
∑
Sτ,A⊆A(w) :
τ [z]=1
xw,τ,A ≤ uw[z], ∀w ∈ W, ∀z ∈ [t]. (12)
It is straightforward to verify that the ILP formulation has
O(m · 2t) integer variables, each with value at most n, and
O(n · m + t · m) inequalities; recall that we have reasoned
that there are at most n ·m non-empty sets Sτ,A. To show the
correctness of the ILP, note that Inequality (8) ensures that the
introduced variables are non-negative. Inequality (9) ensures
in total there are enough students with type τ and acceptable
set A to be matched to the colleges. Inequality (10) ensures
that each college’s capacity is not exceeded while Inequali-
ties (11)–(12) ensure that the lower quotas and upper quotas
of each college are fulfilled.
For one direction, assume that we have values for {xw,τ,A |
w ∈ W ∧ ∅ 6= Sτ,A ⊆ A(w)} which form a solution for the
ILP. We claim that going through each college w ∈ W and
each computed set Sw,τ,A with ∅ 6= Sτ,A ⊆ A(w) and assign-
ing xw,τ,A arbitrary not-yet assigned students from Sw,τ,A
is always possible because of Inequality (9). Moreover, the
constructed matching M is a feasible matching because of
Inequalities (10)–(12).
For the converse direction assume that we have a feasible
matchingM . It can be easily verified that setting
xw,τ,A := |{u ∈ U |M(u) = w ∧ τu = τ ∧ A(u) = A}|
for each w ∈ W and each set Sτ,A with ∅ 6= Sτ,A ⊆ A(w)
yields a solution to the ILP. Inequalities (8)–(9) hold because
M is a matching. Inequalities (10)–(12) hold because M is
feasible.
Corollary 2. FI-DIVERSE can be solved in (m · 2m ·
2t)O(m·2
m·2t) · (n ·m2 + t ·m) time.
Proof. This follows immediately from Lemma 3 and the fact
that solving an ILP with ρ variables and L input bits can
be solved in O(ρ2.5ρ+o(ρ)L) time ([H. W. Lenstra, 1983]
and [Kannan, 1987]).
We have shown that to solve FI-DIVERSE it suffices to
know how many students of the same type vector and the
same acceptable set are assigned to a college. For SMTI-
DIVERSE, we need more information to check stability, i.e.,
to tackle the preferences of the colleges. This is because two
students, even with the same type vectors and the same pref-
erence lists, may be preferred differently by a college, which
is relevant for stability.
Nevertheless, we show in the following that we do not
need to store all students to check stability but only those
that are least preferred by each college and for each type vec-
tor. We introduce two notations to formally describe such
students. Given a matching M , a college v, and a type vec-
tor τ ∈ {0, 1}t, let S(M, v, τ) := {u ∈ M(v) | τu = τ}
denote the set of students with type vector τ that are assigned
to v:
S(M, v, τ) := {u ∈M(v) | τu = τ}, and
let worst(M, v, τ) denote the set of students in M(v) with
type vector τ that v prefers least:
worst(M, v, τ) :={u ∈ S(M, v, τ) | S(M, v, τ) v u}.
Proposition 6. Let M be a feasible matching in an SMTI-
DIVERSE instance. Then, an unmatched student-college
pair {u,w} with w ≻u M(u) is blocking inM if and only if
there is a subset of k students U ′ := {ui1 , . . . , uik} ⊆M(w)
(0 ≤ k ≤ |M(w)|) assigned to w such that
(i) no two students from U ′ have the same type vector,
(ii) each student u′ ∈ U ′ belongs to worst(M,w, τu′ ),
(iii) w strictly prefers u to each student in U ′, and
(iv) M ∪ {{u,w}} \ ({{u,M(u)}} ∪ {{u′, w} | u′ ∈ U ′}
is feasible for w.
Proof. For the “only if” part, assume that {u,w} is block-
ing M , and let U∗ ⊆ M(w) be a subset of students that
witnesses this, i.e., w prefers u to every student in U∗ and
M \({{u,M(u)}}∪{{u,w} | u ∈ U∗})∪{{u,w}} is feasi-
ble forw. We show how to construct a subset U ′ fulfilling the
conditions given in the statement, starting with U ′ := ∅. For
each type vector τ ∈ {0, 1}t with U ′ ∩ S(M, v, τ) 6= ∅, pick
an arbitrary student from worst(M,w, τ) and add it to U ′;
note that such student must exist because U ′ ∩ S(M, v, τ) 6=
∅. Before we show that U ′ fulfills the conditions given in the
statement, we observe that by the definitions of worst and U ′,
the set U ′ characterizes the same set of type vectors as U∗.
Formally,
∀τ ∈ {0, 1}t :
∃ u′ ∈ U ′ : τu′ = τ iff. ∃ u
∗ ∈ U∗ : τu∗ = τ. (13)
Now, we are ready to show that U ′ satisfies Conditions (i)–
(iv). First of all, it is straightforward to check that Condi-
tions (i)–(ii) are fulfilled. Condition (iii) is also satisfied be-
cause of Property (13) and because U∗ witnesses that {u,w}
is a blocking pair. To see why Condition (iv), we observe that
|U ′| ≤ |U∗| (14)
since Condition (i) and Property (13) hold. This implies that
|A(w) \ U ′| ≤ |A(w) \ U ′| < qw; the last inequality holds
because U ′ is a witness. Moreover, by Properties (13)–(14),
it follows that
ℓw ≤
∑
u′∈M(w)\U∗∪{u}
τu′
(13)(14)
≤
∑
u′∈M(w)\U ′∪{u}
τu′ .
It remains to consider the upper quotas, i.e., to show that∑
u′∈M(w)\U ′∪{u} τu′ ≤ uw holds. Suppose, for the sake
of contradiction, that there exists a type z ∈ [t] such that
|{u′ ∈ (A(w) \ U ′) ∪ {u} | τu′ [z] = 1}| > uw[z]. (15)
Since
∑
u′∈A(w) τu′ [z] ≤ uw[z] (because M is feasible)
and τu[z] ∈ {0, 1}, Property (15) implies that τu[z] = 1,∑
u′∈A(w) τu′ [z] = uw[z], and no student in U
′ has type z.
By Property (13) we infer that no student in U∗ has type z.
Together with (15), it follows that
|{u′ ∈ (A(w) \ U∗) ∪ {u} | τu′ [z] = 1}|
=|{u′ ∈ A(w) ∪ {u} | τu′ [z] = 1}|
(15)
> uw[z],
a contradiction to U∗ being a witness.
The “if” part is straightforward asU ′ witnesses that {u,w}
is a blocking pair.
Using Proposition 6, we can give an algorithm to solve
SMTI-DIVERSE in polynomial time whenm+ t is bounded.
Proposition 6 implies that if two matchings have the same in-
formation in terms of least preferred students for each type
vector and the number of students for each type, then either
both are feasible and stable or neither is. Using this insight,
we can use Dynamic Programming (DP) to solve SMTI-
DIVERSE.
Theorem 5. SMTI-DIVERSE is solvable in
O(nm·2
t+(2m+1)·(t+1) ·m2 · (nt · t+m)) time.
Proof. Let I = (U,W, T = [t], (τu,u)u∈U , (w, qw, ℓw,
uw)w∈W ) be an instance of SMTI-DIVERSE. We introduce
an extra type possessed by each student, and require each col-
lege w ∈ W to have no more than qw students for this extra
type to encode capacities by types. For convenience we still
denote |T | = t but keep the additional type in mind for the
running time analysis.
Motivated by Proposition 6, we will exhaustively branch,
for each college and each type vector τ ∈ {0, 1}t, on the
choice of a student wst(wj , τ) ∈ A(wj) ∪ {⊤} who will
be in worst(M,wj , τ) for a hypothetical feasible and sta-
ble matching M . Here wst(wj , τ) = ⊤ is interpreted as
worst(M,wj , τ) = ∅. Moreover we branch to determine the
number#(wj , z) ∈ {ℓwj [z], . . . , uwj [z]} of students of each
type z ∈ [t] that each college wj ∈ W receives byM .
For each such branch we iteratively try to extend M0 =
{{wst(wj , τ), wj} | wj ∈ W, τ ∈ {0, 1}t} to a feasible and
stable matching which conforms to the guesses in the branch,
one not yet matched student at a time.
Assume that U = {u1, . . . , un} and W = {w1,
. . . , wm, wm+1}, where we use wm+1 to receive all students
that are unmatched. Further, let U0 = ∅ and for each i ∈ [n],
let Ui = Ui−1 ∪ {i}.
More specifically, we only add a student-college pair to the
matching if doing so maintains the status that each guessed
wst(wj , τ)-student is least preferred among the students as-
signed to wj with type vector τ , the guessed number of stu-
dents for each college and type is not exceeded, and there
is no induced blocking pair involving the added student and
some guessed wst(wj , τ)-students (as witness). To check
these conditions and more importantly to upper-bound the
number of considered matchings we keep a record in addi-
tion to each constructed (partial) matching, guessed least pre-
ferred students wst(wj , τ), τ ∈ {0, 1}t and the guessed num-
bers#(wj , z) of students, z ∈ [t], wj ∈W .
Records and the corresponding matchings. A record for
a setUi of students is an (m+1)×(t+1)-dimensional integer
matrix Q ∈ {0, . . . , n}(m+1)×(t+1) storing the type-specific
number of students assigned to a college, and the number of
students assigned in total. Formally, for each collegewj ∈W
and each type z ∈ [t], let the number of students fromUi with
type z that are assigned to collegewj be stored inQ[j][z], and
the number of students fromUi that are assigned to collegewj
in total be stored inQ[j][t+1]. We say that two matchingsM1
and M2 have the same record Q if for each college w ∈ W
the following hold:
∑
u∈M1(w)
τw = τu′∈M2(w)τu′ = Q[j].
We also say thatM1 realizes record Q.
Initialization. The initial record Q0 stores the information
forM0, i.e., for each wj ∈W , let Q0[j] :=
∑
u∈M0(wj)
τu.
Update. For the update, we assume that we have all possi-
ble records for the student ui, and, for each Q of the records,
a possible matching such that the number of students for each
specific type is store in Q. For each record Q and a cor-
responding matching M “realizing” the record Q, we con-
sider assigning student ui+1 to each possible college w ∈
A(ui+1)∪{wm+1} in order to build a new record and its cor-
responding matching which includes {ui+1, wj}. We con-
sider the current assignment of matching ui+1 to college wj
if both of the following conditions are met:
(a) ui+1 wj wst(wj , τui+1), and
(b) for each other college w ∈ W \ {wj , wm+1} and each
subset S ⊆ {wst(w, τ) 6= ⊤ | τ ∈ {0, 1}t} of students
with (b1) w ≻ui+1 wj , and (b2) ∀s ∈ S ui+1 ≻w S,
there must be a type z ∈ [t] such that
(b3) #(w, z) + τui+1 [z] −
∑
u′∈S τu′ [z] < ℓw[z] or
#(w, z) + τui+1 [z]−
∑
u′∈S τu′ [z] > uw[z].
otherwise we skip to next possible assignment of match-
ing ui+1 to some college. The record Q
′ for the new match-
ingM ′ := M ∪ {{ui+1, wj}} is constructed as follows:
∀k ∈ [m] : Q′[k] :=
{
Q[k] + τui+1 , if j = k,
Q[k], otherwise.
If Q′ was already constructed in some previous considera-
tion, even if the correspondingmatchings differ, then we also
abandon the current consideration and go to next possible as-
signment.
Checking the numbers. After we have considered the last
student un, and built all records and their corresponding
matchings for all students inUnwe check whether there exists
a record Q with a matchingM that corresponds to the infor-
mation in #(wj , z), i.e., for each college wj ∈ W and each
type z ∈ [t] whether
Q[j][z] = #(wj , z) holds. (16)
We return M once we found a matching fulfilling the above
condition. If no such matching is found, we return that we
have a “no”-instance.
Correctness. We claim that I has a feasible and stable
matchingM if and only if our DP procedure returns a match-
ing.
For the “only if” part, assume that I admits a feasible
and stable matching N∗ and let M∗ = N∗ ∪ {{u,wm+1} |
N∗(u) = ⊥}. Recall that we conduct a DP for each possi-
ble branching of the least preferred students and the number
of students of each type. Thus, let us consider the branching
where
• for eachwj ∈ W \{wm+1} and for each type vector τ ∈
{0, 1}t, it holds that wst(wj , τ) ∈ worst(M∗, wj , τ) if
worst(M∗, wj , τ) 6= ∅; wst(wj , τ) := ⊤ otherwise, and
• for each wj ∈ W and for each type z ∈ [t] it holds that
#(wj , z) =
∑
u′∈M∗(wj)
τu′ [z].
LetM0 be the initial matching containing all the pairs consist-
ing of a college and the guessed least preferred student. Re-
enumerate the remaining unmatched students as u1, . . . , un.
We claim that we will find a matchingM which has the same
record and the same least preferred students asM∗ such that
for each {ui′ ,M(ui′)} with M(ui′) 6= wm+1 both Condi-
tion (a) and Condition (b) are met (setting ui+1 := ui′ and
wj := M(ui′)). Suppose, for the sake of contradiction,
that our DP returns no such matching. Let k ∈ [n] be the
largest index for which the matching M ′ := {{uk, w} ∈
M∗ | k′ ≤ k} ∪ M0 is still considered in the DP. Let Q′
be the record of M ′. If k < n, then consider the branch-
ing where we consider adding {uk+1,M∗(uk+1)} to M ′;
let M ′′ := M ′ ∪ {{uk+1,M
∗(uk+1)}}. Since M
∗ satisfies
Condition (a) (setting ui+1 := uk+1 and wj := M
∗(uk+1))
matchingM ′′ must also satisfy Condition (a). Now, observe
that M∗ also satisfies Condition (b) because otherwise there
exist a college w ∈ W \ {wj , wm+1} and a subset S ⊆
{wst(w, τ) 6= ⊤ | τ ∈ {0, 1}t)} which satisfy (b1) and (b2)
such that ℓw[z] ≤ #(w, z)+τuk+1 [z]−
∑
u′∈S τu′ [z] ≤ uw[z]
for each type z ∈ [t]. Since#(w, z) is also the number of stu-
dents with type z which are assigned tow inM∗, the subset S
witnesses that (uk+1, wj) is a blocking pair, a contradiction.
Thus,M ′′ also satisfies Condition (b). Hence, the only reason
we abandonedM ′′ for the later branching is that there exists
another matching Mk+1 with the same record as M
′′ such
that Conditions (a)–(b) are met for (uk+1,Mk+1(uk+1)).
Analogously, we can infer that after we have considered stu-
dent un, there must be a matching Mn which has the same
record and the same least preferred students asM∗ such that
for each {ui′ ,Mn(ui′)} withMn(ui′) 6= wm+1 both Condi-
tion (a) and Condition (b) are met (setting ui+1 := ui′ and
wj := Mn(ui′)). Let Qn be the corresponding record. Then,
Qn must also satisfy the checking given in (16).
We have just shown that our DP returns a matching Mn
that has the same “crucial information” as M∗. Then, Mn
must be a feasible and stable matching. Obviously, Mn is
feasible because M∗ and Mn have the same record Qn. To
see that Mn is stable, let us consider an arbitrary unmatched
pair {u,w} /∈ Mn and an arbitrary subset S ⊆ Mn(w) of
students assigned to w such that student u strictly prefers w
to Mn(u) and college w strictly prefers u to every student
in S. Assume for contradiction, that S is a witness for
{u,w} being a blocking pair of Mn. Then, it must hold that
Mn ∪ {{u,w}} \ ({{u,Mn(u)}} ∪ {{u′, w} | u′ ∈ S})
is feasible for w. By Proposition 6, there exists a sub-
set U ′ := {wst(w, τ) 6= ⊤ | τ ∈ {0, 1}t} of students such
that w strictly prefers u to U ′ and
ℓu ≤ τu +
∑
u′∈Mn(w)\U ′
τu′ ≤ uw.
This means that when we consider branching on adding the
pair {u,w} Condition (b) in the update step does not hold
for ui+1 := u and wj := w, a contradiction. Thus, Mn is
also stable.
For the “if” part, assume that for some choices of least pre-
ferred students wst(wj , τ) and “feasible” numbers#(wj , z),
the DP returns a matching N . We claim that M := N \
{{u,wm+1} ∈ N} is a feasible and stable matching for I .
It is straight-forward to see that M is feasible because we
only branch on “feasible” numbers and N satisfies the final
check (16). For the stability, suppose, for the sake of con-
tradiction, that an unmatched pair {u,w} /∈ M with u pre-
ferring w to M(u) is blocking M . Then, by Proposition 6,
there exists a subset U ′ := {ui1 , . . . , uik} ⊆ M(w) of k stu-
dents for which Conditions (i)–(iv) hold. Since Condition (ii)
holds for U ′, for each uis ∈ U
′ (s ∈ [k]) there exists ex-
actly one guessed least preferred student wst(wj , τui1 ) with
wst(wj , τui1 ) 6= ⊤. Then, U
′′ := {wst(wj , τu) | u ∈ U ′}
must also be a subset satisfying Conditions (iii)–(iv). In other
words, U ′′ does not fulfill Condition (b3) when we consider
adding the pair {u,M(u)}, a contradiction to M being re-
turned.
Running time. For each of the O(nm·2
t
· nm·(t+1)) pos-
sible starting branches, we iteratively match each student to
some college. As, we only keep a matching if the newly
constructed record is distinct from existing ones and there
are at most nm·(t+1) different records, there are O(nm·(t+1))
matchings to maintain. For each considered student ui and
each existing record for the students Ui−1, we have O(m)
possibilities to assign ui. To check (a) we require 2
t many
steps. Note that for (b) we only need to consider subsets
S of size at most t, which then leads to a checking time of
O(m · nt · t). For each considered student, checking whether
some record already exists takes in total O(m2) time be-
cause there are at most m records that are relevant for the
comparisons. After having considered student un, we check
whether at least one of the constructed matchings fulfills
Property (16) in O(t) time. In total, the running time lies
inO
(
nm·2
t+m·(t+1) · n · nm·(t+1) · (m · nt · (t+2t+m ·nt ·
t+m2)+t)
)
= O(nm·2
t+(2m+1)·(t+1) ·m2 ·(nt ·t+m)).
5 Conclusion
We identified and studied a natural, albeit highly in-
tractable, stable matching problem enhanced with diversity
constraints (SMTI-DIVERSE). We located the source of in-
tractability by considering both relaxations (by dropping the
lower quotas or the stability constraints) and restrictions (such
as upper-bounding the number n of students, the number t of
types, the numberm of colleges, and/or the maximum upper
quota u∞, and the maximum capacity q∞). While most of the
cases are still at least NP-hard, we also identified special cases
for which we provided polynomial-time algorithms. This im-
plies that the respective problems lie in the class XP in terms
of parameterized complexity [Downey and Fellows, 2013;
Flum and Grohe, 2006; Niedermeier, 2006; Cygan et al.,
2015]. A natural question is whether the XP results can be
improved to fixed-parameterized tractability. For instance,
with respect to the number n of students, we indeed obtain an
exponential-size problem kernel, which implies that SMTI-
DIVERSE parameterized by n is fixed-parameter tractable,
and we can show that polynomial-size kernels are unlikely to
exist. However, for the numberm of colleges combined with
the maximum capacity q∞, our algorithms (except for the
case when ℓ∞ = 0 and no ties are present) are essentially op-
timal because we can show that both SMI-DIVERSE and FI-
DIVERSE are W[2]-hard; this refutes any fixed-parameter al-
gorithms for (m+q∞) unless FPT=W[2]. For the combined
parameterm+t (recall that t denotes the number of types), we
can encode FI-DIVERSE via an integer linear program for-
mulation with f(m, t) variables and a polynomial number of
inequalities, and show that it is fixed-parameter tractable for
m+ t. Summarizing, the only considered fragment left open
in terms of fixed parameter tractability is SMTI-DIVERSE
parameterized by (m+ t).
Continuing with parameterized complexity research we
can also explore other parameters associated with the under-
lying acceptability graph and the type graph (a student is con-
nected to a type via an edge if she has this type), such as tree
width [Gupta et al., 2017; Bredereck et al., 2019b].
Another interesting future research direction is to investi-
gate the trade-off between stability and diversity by allowing
few blocking pairs [Abraham et al., 2005; Chen et al., 2018]
or few unsatisfied diversity constraints.
Last but not least, it would also be interesting to know
whether SMTI-DIVERSE becomes polynomial-time solvable
when the input preferences are for instance single-peaked or
single-crossing [Bredereck et al., 2017].
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A Results on Parameterized Complexity
We complement the algorithms from Proposition 5 with the
following W[2]-hardness results.
Proposition 7. FI-DIVERSE and SMI-DIVERSE parameter-
ized bym+ q∞ areW[2]-hard.
Proof. We show this by providing a parameterized reduction
from the W[2]-complete SET COVER problem, parameter-
ized by the solution size [Downey and Fellows, 2013].
SET COVER
Input: An n∗-element universe U = {x1, . . . , xn∗}, a
collection S = {S1, . . . , Sm∗} of m∗ sets, where each
Si ⊆ U and U ⊆
⋃
i∈[m] Si and k ∈ N with k ≤ m.
Question: Is there a size-at-most-k set cover, i.e., a
subcollection C ⊆ S with |C| ≤ k such that U ⊆⋃
S∈C S?
Let I = (U ,S = {S1, . . . , Sm∗}, k) be a SET COVER in-
stance; without loss of generality assume that m∗ > k ≥ 1.
We construct an FI-DIVERSE/SMI-DIVERSE instance as fol-
lows. Let U = {s1, . . . , sm∗ , d1, . . . , dm∗}, W = {w} and
t = n∗ + m∗ + 1. We also refer to S := {s1, . . . sm∗} as
the set-students, and to D := {d1, . . . dm∗} as the dummy-
students. Furthermore, let A(w) = U , i.e., we have unre-
stricted acceptability. This uniquely defines the preference
lists of all students. The preference list of w is given by
s1 ≻w d1 ≻w · · · ≻w sm∗ ≻w dm∗ .
There are n∗ +m∗ + 1 types: the first n∗ ones correspond
to the elements, the middle m∗ ones correspond to the sets,
while the last one is dedicated to the dummy students which
will allow only k dummy students to be assigned to w. For
each set-student si, set τsi [z] = 1 if “z ∈ [n
∗] and xz ∈
Si”, or “z = n
∗ + i”. That is, the set-student corresponding
to Si has type n
∗ + i, as well as types corresponding to Si’s
elements. For each dummy student di, set τdi [z] = 1 if “z ∈
[n∗+1, n∗+m∗] and z 6= n∗+i”, or “z = n∗+m∗+1”. That
is, all dummy students have type n∗+m∗ +1, and a dummy
student corresponding to Si has the types corresponding to all
other sets given in the SET COVER instance. In other words,
si and di together cover all the set-types.
Set ℓw = {1}n
∗
{k}m
∗+1, uw = {k}n
∗+m∗+1 and
qw = 2k. This concludes the construction of the FI-
DIVERSE/SMI-DIVERSE instance.
We claim that a solution for the original instance of SET
COVER infers a solution for the constructed instance of FI-
DIVERSE/SMI-DIVERSE, and vice versa.
For the first direction, let C be a size-k set cover for I; we
add arbitrary sets to C to make sure that C has indeed exactly
k sets. Start withM := {{si, w}, {di, w} | Si ∈ C}. Feasi-
bility is straightforward to check. Assume for contradiction,
that M is not stable, i.e., there is some blocking pair {u,w}
forM . Let this be witnessed by U ′ ⊆ M(w). There are two
cases for u, either u = si or u = di for some i ∈ [m∗] such
that Si /∈ C. First of all, since college w already receives qw
students, it follows that |U ′| ≥ 1.
• If u = di, then since the lower quota and upper quota of
w for the type n∗ +m∗ + 1 are equal to k and only the
dummy students have such type, it follows thatU ′∩D =
{dj} with j 6= i. By our definition of M , it follows
that si /∈ M(w) and that no student in U ′ \ {dj} has
type n∗+i. However, since student dj has type n
∗+i but
student di does not, replacing di with U
′ will exceed the
upper quota of w regarding type n++ i, a contradiction.
• If u = si, then since the lower quota and upper quota of
w for type n∗ +m∗ + 1 are equal to k but only dummy
students have such type, it follows that U ′ ∩ D = ∅.
However, since the lower quota and the upper quota for
type {n∗ + i} are equal to k and since no set-student
other than si has this type, it follows that that U
′ must
contain a dummy student, a contradiction.
ThusM is indeed feasible and stable.
Conversely, given a feasible (and stable1) matchingM for
the constructed instance, C := {Si | {si, w} ∈ M} is a
solution to the original SET COVER instance: |C| ≤ k is
ensured by qw = 2k and there are exactly k dummy students
in M(w). U ⊆
⋃
i:Si∈C
Si is ensured by ℓw[z] = 1 and
τsi [z] = 1⇔ xz ∈ Si for all z ∈ [n
∗].
Obviously in our constructed instance m = 1 and q∞ =
2k which makes this a valid parameterized reduction from
SET COVER parameterized by k to FI-DIVERSE, and SMI-
DIVERSE respectively parameterized bym+ q∞.
However, when no ties are present and ℓ∞ = 0, we are able
to provide an FPT algorithm for SMI-DIVERSE with respect
tom+ q∞. It is based on the following observation.
Observation 4. Assume that there are no ties and ℓ∞ = 0.
If student u is college w’s most preferred student such that
τu ≤ uw, then each stable matching must assign a college w′
to u with w′ u w.
Proof. Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that there ex-
ists a stable matchingM with w ≻u M(w). Then, {u,w} is
blockingM as w prefers u to M(w) and can replace M(w)
with u to obtain a new feasible matching.
Observation 4 can be used to extend the Gale-Shapley al-
gorithm so as to obtain an FPT algorithm form+ q∞.
Proposition 8. If ℓ∞ = 0, then SMI-DIVERSE can be solved
in O(mm·q∞ · n ·m · t) time.
Proof Sketch. Let I = (U,W, (τu)u∈U , (≻x)x∈U∪W (qw,
ℓw = 0, uw)w∈W ) be an instance of SMI-DIVERSE. The
idea of our algorithm is to start with a feasible empty match-
ing M , and iteratively find an unassigned student u ∈ U for
which there exists a college w ∈ A(u) such that
|M(w)| < qw and τu +
∑
v∈M(w)
τv ≤ uw (17)
(i.e., w has still some capacity to accommodate u and assign-
ing u to w does not exceed the upper quotas) and u there
is no unassigned student which is strictly preferred over u
by w satisfying (17). If there is no such student, then we
check whether the constructed matching is stable by using the
polynomial-time algorithm given in Lemma 2. Otherwise,
1This fact is not necessary for showing that the SET COVER in-
stance I is a yes instance.
based on Observation 4, every stable matching must assign
some college to u. Hence, we branch into assigning each one
college w′ from A(u) to u, i.e., adding {u,w′} to M . For
each possible branch, we check for a next student satisfying
Condition (17), and continue as described. We return “no” if
no constructed matching is stable.
As for the running time, since there are at mostm branches
for each found student and in each branch at least one college
receives one more student, the search tree built according to
our branching algorithm has depthO(q∞ ·m) andO(mq∞·m)
nodes. Since in each node of the search tree we can find a
next student in linear time and at each leaf of the search tree
we can check stability in linear time using Lemma 2, we can
decide I in O(mm·q∞ · n ·m · t) time.
The condition that ℓ∞ = 0 cannot be dropped for the fixed
parameter tractability given in Proposition 8, as is signified
by the following result.
Proposition 9. SMTI-DIVERSE parameterized by m + q∞
remains W[1]-hard, even when ℓ∞ = 0.
Proof. We provide a parameterized reduction from the W[1]-
complete SET PACKING problem, parameterized by the solu-
tion size k [Downey and Fellows, 2013].
SET PACKING
Input: An n∗-element universe U = {x1, . . . , xn∗}, a
collection S = {S1, . . . , Sm∗} of m
∗ sets, where each
Si ⊆ U , and k ∈ N with k ≤ m.
Question: It there size-at-least-k set packing, i.e., a
subcollection C ⊆ S with |C| ≤ k such that for each
two sets S, S′ ∈ C it holds that S ∩ S′ = ∅?
Let U , S1, . . . , Sm∗ and k be a SET PACKING instance. We
construct a SMTI-DIVERSE instance as follows: Let U =
{u1, . . . , um∗ , r1, r2, r3},W = {w, a, b} and t = n∗+2. For
all i ∈ [m∗], and z ∈ [n∗] set τui [z] = 1 whenever xz ∈ Si,
and set τui(m
∗ + 1) = τui(m
∗ + 2) = 0. That is, a student
corresponding to Si has exactly the types corresponding to
Si’s elements. Further, for each i ∈ [m∗], let A(ui) = {w},
which also uniquely determines the preference list of ui. Set
all other preferences, types, quotas and capacities according
to the following table, where the preferences of w have all
students from {u1, . . . , um∗} tied at the first position and rank
student r2 at the second position while all other preferences
do not have ties and are ordered by ≻:
S. Pref. T. C. Pref. UQ. C.
r1 : b a {0}n
∗
10 w : {u1, . . . , um∗} r2{1}n
∗+2 k
r2 : b w a {0}
n∗11 a : r1 r2 r3 {0}
n∗11 1
r3 : a b {0}n
∗
01 b : r3 r2 r1 {0}n
∗
11 2
We set the lower quotas to zero. This completes the construc-
tion of the instance, which can clearly be done in polynomial
time.
We claim that a size-at-least-k set packing for I infers a
feasible and stable matching for the constructed instance of
SMTI-DIVERSE, and vice versa.
For the first direction, letC be a set packing with k sets; we
delete arbitrary sets fromC to ensure that C has size k. Then,
we claim that the matchingM := {{r1, b}, {r2, a}, {r3, b}}∪
{{ui, w} | Si ∈ C} is a solution for the SMTI-DIVERSE
instance: Feasibility can be easily verified. Assume for con-
tradiction, that M is not stable, i.e., there is some blocking
pair {α, β} forM . Note that because |M(w)| = |{ui | Si ∈
C}| = |C| = k = qw, we can apply Lemma 1(1). Hence
we know that α ∈ {ui | i ∈ [m∗]} and β = w. Because
|M(w)| = qw, this has to be witnessed by some non-empty
subset of M(w). However there cannot be such a set which
is strictly preferred over α which is a contradiction. ThusM
is indeed a feasible and stable matching for the constructed
SMTI-DIVERSE instance.
Conversely, given a feasible and stable matchingM for the
constructed instance, C = {Si | {ui, w} ∈ M} is a size-
k set packing for the original SET PACKING instance: By
Lemma 1(2), the stability ofM implies that |{{ui, w} ∈M |
i ∈ [m∗]}| = qw = k, and thus |C| = k. Moreover the upper
quotas for w and the types of the elements of C, ensure that
no two sets in C have non-empty intersection, for otherwise
the upper quota of some type that corresponds to the element
in the intersection would be exceeded. Thus C is indeed a set
packing for the original SET PACKING instance.
Obviously in our constructed instance ℓ∞ = 0,m = 3 and
q∞ = k which makes this a valid parameterized reduction
from SET PACKING parameterized by k to SMTI-DIVERSE
with ℓ∞ = 0 parameterized bym+ q∞.
We have shown that SMTI-DIVERSE parameterized by n
is fixed-parameter tractable (Theorem 4) since it admits an
exponential-size problem kernel (Theorem 4). In the follow-
ing, we show that a polynomial-size problem kernel is un-
likely to exist.
Proposition 10. FI-DIVERSE and SMTI-DIVERSE do not
admit a problem kernel with size polynomially bounded by
m+ t+ q∞, unless NP ⊆ coNP/P.
Proof. To see this for FI-DIVERSE, we note that the reduc-
tion given by Aziz et al. [2019, Proposition 5.1] can be con-
sidered as from SET COVER. It produces an instance to FI-
DIVERSE where the number t of types is equal to the size
of the universe U , the number of colleges is one, and the
maximum capacity is equal to the set cover size k. Since
SET COVER does not admit a polynomial-size problem ker-
nel for |U|+k, it follows that neither does FI-DIVERSE admit
a polynomial-size problem kernel for m + t + q∞ [Dom et
al., 2009].
The above reasoning can be used to show the same for
SMTI-DIVERSE.
Proposition 11. FI-DIVERSE and SMI-DIVERSE do not ad-
mit a problem kernel with size polynomially bounded by n,
unless NP ⊆ coNP/P.
Proof. This follows immediately from the parameterized
reduction from SET COVER to FI-DIVERSE and SMI-
DIVERSE given in the proof of Proposition 7, and the fact
that unless NP ⊆ coNP/P, SET COVER parameterized by
the size of the size of the set collection S does not admit a
polynomial-size problem kernel [Bredereck et al., 2014, The-
orem 5].
